Essays on markets with asymmetries of information and strategic experimentation by Dosis, Anastasios
  
 
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap  
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/63678  
 
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to 
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
 
 
 
University of Warwick
Department of Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences
THESIS
Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
presented by
Anastasios Dosis
supervised by
Professor Herakles Polemarchakis
and
Professor Motty Perry
Essays on Markets with Asymmetries of Information
and Strategic Experimentation
July 2014
ii
Contents
Acknowledgments v
0.1 Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection . . . . . . . . . 1
0.2 Strategic Experimentation in R&D Races . . . . . . . . . . . 2
I Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection 3
1 Investment, Adverse Selection and Optimal Redistributive
Taxation 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 The Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Equilibria without Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Optimal Redistributive Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Strategic Foundations for Efficient Competitive Markets with
Adverse Selection 17
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Some Preliminary Properties of Incentive Compatible Alloca-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 The Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Equilibria and their Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.6 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.1 Managerial Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.2 Credit Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.3 The Informed Seller Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
iii
iv Contents
II Strategic Experimentation in R&D 39
3 Strategic Experimentation in R&D Races 41
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 Equilibrium in Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.1 Both Firms in the Development Phase . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.2 One Team in the Research and the Other in the De-
velopment Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.3 Research Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
III Annexes 55
A Chapter 1 57
A.1 Proof of existence of an interior maximum under complete
information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.2 Proof that both types strictly prefer the first-best contract of
type H over this of type L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1.4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
List of figures 63
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my advisors Herakles Polemarchakis and Motty Perry
for their help, support and guidance throughout my studies. I am also
greatly indebted to Peter Hammond, Phil Reny and Paolo Siconolfi for many
stimulating conversations and important suggestions that contributed the
maximum to the completion of this thesis.
I would also like to thank my parents who invested in me and played
an invaluable role with their love and support throughout my studies. Last
but not least, I want to thank my wife Vicky for the patience and love she
showed throughout this journey. I would of never been able to complete this
thesis without her by my side.
v
vi Acknowledgments
Introduction
§ 0.1 Competitive Markets with Adverse Selec-
tion
Part 1 of the thesis is a theoretical investigation of (strategic) competitive
markets with adverse selection. In this part, I propose possible optimal
policies to correct inefficiencies that may be caused in competitive markets
because of asymmetries of information among agents. Specifically Part 1
contains two distinct chapters.
In Chapter 1, the impact of redistributive taxation in a credit market
with adverse selection is examined. The market consists of different types of
entrepreneurs who need to borrow from banks to invest in stochastic tech-
nologies. Adverse selection leads to credit rationing, and the economy is
characterised by low aggregate investment and constrained suboptimal allo-
cations. It is shown that an anonymous, redistributive budget-balanced tax
system can increase aggregate investment and lead to Pareto improvements.
Unlike what is usually believed, it is shown that every entrepreneur benefits
from the tax system, even if, in expectation, high-productivity entrepreneurs
pay in taxes more than they receive in subsidies.
In Chapter 2, I model a competitive insurance market with adverse se-
lection as an “informed-principal game”. The informed buyer offers a set of
contracts to all uninformed sellers, who accept or reject. If all sellers reject,
then there is no trade. Otherwise, each one of the sellers who accepted has
the right to add more contracts to the already existing offer if he wishes so.
The buyer can choose one contract from one seller at the last stage of the
game. I characterise the set perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. I show
that the well-known Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) allocation places a
lower bound in the equilibrium payoff of each type and is the unique equi-
librium allocation (or a “strong solution”) when it is not Pareto dominated.
Every interim incentive efficient allocation, that weakly Pareto dominates
the RSW allocation, is an equilibrium allocation. Bertrand-type competition
among sellers drives expected profits to zero and demands every equilibrium
1
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allocation to be interim incentive efficient. The approach extends to any
finite number of types and states, and to other similar markets like credit,
labour or informed seller markets.
§ 0.2 Strategic Experimentation in R&D Races
Part 2 of the thesis is a joint work with Abhinay Muthoo, Alex Gershkov
and Motty Perry with equal shares in all aspects of the paper.
In this part, we study a patent race between two firms as a two-armed
bandit model. The first firm that successfully completes two phases (R&D)
acquires a patent license. Each firm can learn from its rival’s actions and
outcomes. We show that two possible inefficiencies can be observed in equi-
librium. On the one hand, spill-overs of information reduce the expected
profitability of the patent and therefore firms may invest inadequately in
R&D, in the fear of releasing good news to the market. On the other
hand, an opposite, “tragedy-of-the-commons”, effect may prevail, accord-
ing to which R&D investment is socially excessive.
Part
Competitive Markets with Adverse
Selection
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- Chapter 1 -
Investment, Adverse Selection and Optimal
Redistributive Taxation
§ 1.1 Introduction
It is commonly believed that corporate taxation distorts social efficiency
and decreases the level of investment in the economy. The usual argument
is that high taxation discourages the most productive entrepreneurs from
investing in risky technologies because they are most likely to bear the cost
of subsidising the tax system. Therefore, the economy is likely to fall into a
trap of low investment and output.
This paper shows that this argument does not necessarily apply to credit
markets with adverse selection. In particular, it is shown that an opposite
(counterintuitive) effect may prevail: The government, by increasing taxes,
can not only increase economy’s investment, but also create Pareto improve-
ments compared to the market outcome.
I analyse a simple credit market with entrepreneurial investment and
banks. Entrepreneurs are endowed with stochastic investment technologies
which can be either high- or low-productivity. Given that they do not possess
any wealth, they need to borrow from wealthy banks in order to invest. The
type of each entrepreneur is his private information leading to an adverse
selection problem. The market is formulated as a signaling game in which
entrepreneurs apply to a bank for a loan contract and the bank decides either
to accept or reject. The only sorting devices are the amount of loan and the
interest rate.1 For instance, an entrepreneur can apply for a contract with
a lower amount of loan at a lower interest rate in order to signal that he is
a good type.
1Interest rates here refer to the per unit of borrowing/investment payment in case of
success and failure. These two may be different depending on the contract signed.
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Given that the amount of loan of the high-productive entrepreneur is
distorted downwards, there is some kind of credit rationing in the market.2
As it is shown, this form of credit rationing creates inefficiencies; equilib-
rium aggregate investment is relatively low and the equilibrium allocation
is constrained Pareto suboptimal. I show that a carefully designed redis-
tributive tax system can increase aggregate investment and create Pareto
improvements. Evidently, the government does neither possess any superior
information than banks, nor, does it provide any additional financing to en-
trepreneurs at the time of contracting. The unique intervention is in action
only after the realisation of uncertainty and it takes the form of redistri-
bution of wealth. This redistribution not only, as expected, does it benefit
the low-productive entrepreneurs (who are cross-subsidised), but also allows
the high-productive ones to apply for contract that are contingent on the
subsidy they will receive from the government. This relaxes the incentive
constraint and allows them to leverage/invest more and also increase their
payoff.
The tax system is not unique, but there is a set of taxes that results to
equilibria that are Pareto superior to the no tax equilibria. This is in con-
trast to what is usually believed that redistributive taxation is distortionary
and harms the most productive types. Interestingly, it is shown that econ-
omy’s aggregate investment is monotonically increasing in the level of taxes
when these increase welfare. This provides a rationale of why governments
increase taxes and provide “stimulus packs” in order to spark the economy in
times of recession and when banks refuse to provide high loans to applicants.
Related Literature. The paper builds on the rich literature of credit
markets with asymmetric information. Stiglitz and Weiss [57] show that
when banks cannot observe the riskiness of the projects they are asked to
finance and entrepreneurs have no signaling device, other than the interest
rate, the latter may be declined financing. Bester [7, 8] highlights the role
of collateral as a signaling device in this type of credit markets. De Meza
and Webb [17] argue that, in contrast to Stiglitz and Weiss [57], a slight
difference in the technologies of entrepreneurs can lead to excessive invest-
ment instead of credit rationing. Note that in my model investment is a
continuous variable as opposed to all the papers mentioned above where it
is indivisible.
The closest environment to this paper is Martin [41], who shows how
entrepreneurial wealth affects economy’s aggregate investment. Interest-
ingly, in his model there may be a non-monotonic relationship between en-
trepreneurial wealth and investment. Intuitively, this happens because en-
2There are two forms of credit rationing discussed in the literature. One is similar to
the one examined in this paper. The other one takes place when there is excess demand
in the market and some applicants are declined credit. See Jaffee and Russel [33] and
Stiglitz and Weiss [57].
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trepreneurial wealth can be used as collateral by some types and therefore
switch the equilibrium from pooling to separating causing a discontinuous
change in the investment level.
Wilson [59] and Dahlby [13] show how government interventions can
create Pareto improvements in competitive insurance markets with adverse
selection. This paper differs from Wilson [59] and Dahlby [13] in at least
two respects: First, the approach concerns primarily credit markets (as
opposed to insurance markets), where risk-neutral entrepreneurs invest in
stochastic investment technologies. Second, in this paper, it is shown how
the composition of aggregate investment is affected by taxes and it is rather
not straightforward how decisions taken after the realisation of production
can affect the decisions for investment at the ex ante stage.
Bisin and Gottardi [9] show how, in the Rothschild and Stiglitz [55] in-
surance market, property rights can alleviate the incentive constraints and
help the economy attain Pareto efficiency. Similar to Bisin and Gottardi
[9] but in a credit market, Martin [42] shows that the government, by es-
tablishing a new market at the ex ante stage in which entrepreneurs can
borrow without conditioning their loans, Pareto efficiency can be attained.
Along the same lines, Innes [32] shows how the government can increase
social welfare by offering subsidised debt contracts in credit markets with
adverse selection. Martin[42] and Innes [32] are the closest environments to
my paper and, in fact, they should be considered as complementary. The
main difference is on the type of intervention. In these papers any interven-
tion occurs in the ex ante stage (where investment decisions take place) in
the form of creation of a new lending market regulated by the government,
whereas in the present paper ex post (when entrepreneurs have realised any
production) in the form of taxation.
In Section 1.2, the economy is described. In section 1.3, the equilibria
without taxes under perfect and imperfect information are characterised. In
Section 1.4, the equilibria of the economy with taxes are analysed and the
Pareto improving taxes are proposed. In Section 1.5, I discuss some of the
important assumptions as well as other relevant topics.
§ 1.2 The Economy
Entrepreneurs. There are only two periods t = 0, 1 and one consumption-
investment good which is perishable.3 There is a continuum of mass one of
entrepreneurs, who are categorised into two types denoted H and L for “high
productivity” and “low productivity” respectively. Therefore, i = H,L. A
set of measure λ is of type H and 1−λ is of type L. They do not possess any
3The economy is similar to that of Martin [41] with the only difference that en-
trepreneurs do not possess any initial wealth at the time of contracting. This is only
for simplicity and without loss of generality.
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initial wealth but they own stochastic investment technologies which take
the following form: By investing X units in period t = 0 an entrepreneur can
realise γif(X) units in period t = 1 with probability pii and zero otherwise.
Uncertainty is purely idiosyncratic.
Assumption 1.2.1. f(·) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly in-
creasing, concave and satisfies Inada’s conditions namely limX→0 f ′(X) =
∞ and limX→∞ f ′(X) = 0. f(0) = 0
Assumption 1.2.2. piH > piL, γH < γL but piHγH > piLγL
The investment technology of type H second-order stochastically dom-
inates this of type L.4 According to Assumption 1.2.1, f(·) is a normal
decreasing-returns-to-scale production function. Inada’s conditions are nec-
essary to guarantee interior solutions. On the other hand, to validate As-
sumption 1.2.2, one can think that entrepreneurs of type L adopt riskier
technologies, but conditional on success, they have higher marginal produc-
tivity.
The type of every entrepreneur is his private information. Denote as
pi = λpiH + (1−λ)piL the population’s average probability of success. By an
appropriate version of the law of large numbers, a set of measure pi will be
in the success state, whereas, a set of measure 1 − pi will be in the failure
state. Assume that only the individual state is observable and verifiable
by a court of law. That way, entrepreneurs’ types cannot be inferred after
production has taken place, by observing the level of production. Lastly, all
entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and indifferent between consuming in period
t = 0 and t = 1.
Banks. There is a finite number of banks in this economy j = {1, ..., n},
where n is also the number of banks. They own enough endowment of
the consumption good in period t = 0, and they can lend funds to en-
trepreneurs.5 All banks have the same endowment in period t = 0, are
risk neutral, and indifferent between consuming in period t = 0 and t = 1.
Therefore, the risk-free interest rate is zero.
Contracts take the following form: (Xi, Rs,i, Rf,i), whereXi is the amount
of loan, Rs,i is the per unit of loan payment in case of success and Rf,i is
the per unit of loan payment in case of failure. The expected profit of each
entrepreneur from such a contract can be written as:
V i(Xi, Rs,i, Rf,i) = pii(γif(Xi)−Rs,iXi)− (1− pii)Rf,iXi,
Credit Market. The market is formulated as a signaling game. All con-
tracts are available from all banks, and each entrepreneur applies to anyone
4All these assumptions are very common in the credit rationing literature.
5To be precise, banks own enough endowment to finance all entrepreneurs under com-
plete information.
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he wants. Each bank then either accepts the application (in which case the
entrepreneur can acquire funds at the predetermined interest rate) or re-
jects (in which case the entrepreneur who applied for this contract does not
acquire any funds and therefore does not invest). Contracts are exclusive
so each entrepreneur can acquire financing from only one bank. This is a
pure signaling game like the one analysed by Spence [56]. Because signaling
games admit too many equilibria, we will only examine equilibria that pass
the “intuitive criterion” of Cho and Kreps [11].
§ 1.3 Equilibria without Taxes
Perfect Information. As a benchmark case, I characterise the equilibria
of the economy under perfect information. The equilibrium contracts are
straightforward to be calculated:6
f ′(XFBi ) =
1
γipii
(1.1)
piiR
FB
s,i X
FB
i + (1− pii)RFBf,i XFBi = XFBi (1.2)
Note that because of risk neutrality, there is a continuum of Nash equi-
libria that are all payoff equivalent. Any contract (XFBi , R
BF
s,i , R
FB
f,i ), with
RBFs,i , R
FB
f,i satisfying (1.2) can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium since at
all of them banks make zero profits and there is no other contract that
makes positive profits and gives each type higher payoff. Because of the
single-crossing property, any equilibrium is fully separating. As expected,
entrepreneurs of type H invest more in the production technology and repay
less, in expectation, per unit of investment. Given that no type has positive
wealth in the state of failure, RFBf,i ≤ 0, in the sense that entrepreneur of
type i receives a transfer from the bank.
Imperfect Information. Now consider the case where no outsider, other
than each entrepreneur, can observe his true type. The above full-information
contracts cannot constitute an equilibrium under incomplete information
anymore. This is because entrepreneurs of type L have an incentive to mis-
represent their types and also apply for type H’s contract which gives them
higher profits.7 But that would violate the zero profit condition for the
banks and therefore it cannot constitute an equilibrium.
The set of PBE of the signaling game includes any incentive compatible
and positive profit allocation with the requirement that type L’s payoff is at
least the payoff from (XFBL , R
BF
s,L , R
FB
f,L ). The only allocation that survives
6For a formal proof of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under complete infor-
mation see Appendix A.1
7See Appendix A for a formal proof.
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the intuitive criterion is the “least-costly” allocation; the separating allo-
cation that maximises the payoffs of both types within the set of incentive
compatible allocations that make zero profits for all possible beliefs.
Proposition 1.3.1 combines all the above observations and characterises
a separating equilibrium of our economy. Note that there exists a continuum
of separating equilibria that are all payoff equivalent.8
Proposition 1.3.1. The only PBE that passes the intuitive criterion is
separating and characterised by a pair of contracts satisfying:
(XL, RLs , R
L
f ) = (X
FB
L , R
FB
s,L , R
FB
f,H), (1.3)
and,
(XH , RHs , R
H
f ) = (X
NT
H ,
1
piH
, 0), (1.4)
where XNTH is the smallest root of γLf(XH)− XHpiH = γLf(XFBL )−
XFBL
piL
.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
When information is asymmetric, type H is restricted by the incentive
constraint. He cannot invest as much as he could in the case of complete
information. Actually, given the maintained assumptions, type H invests
even less than type L. Because screening must take place through the level
of investment, type H’s investment must be distorted in such a way that his
contract is not anymore desirable by type L.
Some comparative static analysis might be useful to better comprehend
Proposition 1.3.1. Intuitively, ceteris paribus, an increase (decrease) in γL
would relax (tighten) the incentive constraint of type L, and therefore more
(less) investment would flow into the technology of type H.
§ 1.4 Optimal Redistributive Taxes
In this section, I assume that there is a government who can perfectly
commit to a redistributive tax system. This tax system is relatively simple
and takes the following form: Every entrepreneur, regardless his type, is
taxed ts in case he succeeds, and receives tf as a subsidy in case he fails,
in period t = 1. Notably, the government does not know the true type
of each entrepreneur but can fully observe the realisation of the individual
8As it is proved in Appendix A.3 in any equilibrium, the contract for type H is unique
but there are many equilibrium contracts for type L that are all payoff equivalent. Intu-
itively, this happens because the incentive constraint of type H is not binding and therefore
there are many contracts that make zero profits and provide type L with the same payoff.
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state in period t = 1 as it is the case with banks.9 It is important to be
clear that the government does not impose or suggests any contracts or
allocations. Its only tool is the tax system. We will only consider “budget-
balanced” redistributive taxes, or: pi ts = (1 − pi) tf . In other words,
the government just redistributes the wealth in period t = 1 and does not
provide any additional resources to entrepreneurs in either period. Moreover,
taxes are non-discriminatory (or anonymous) in the sense that all types of
entrepreneurs pay the same tax and receive the same subsidy. In fact, the
proof of Pareto improving taxes is divided into two steps. In the first step,
the impact of taxation in the equilibrium contracts is examined. As it was
argued above, even though taxation takes place ex post and contracts are
signed ex ante, any subsidy expected to be paid by the government in period
t = 1 can now be used in the equilibrium contracts. This is enough to
influence the behaviour of all players in the game. Indeed, one can easily
show that any subsidy small enough will be used in the equilibrium contract
by type H in order to borrow more. This will relax type L’s incentive
constraint and allow for more investment to flow into type H’s production
technology. Intuitively, this happens because type H is more willing to give
up any subsidy in the failure state in order to decrease his payment in the
success state, making, that way, her contract less desirable by type L.
The proof of Pareto improving taxes is divided into two steps. In the first
step, the impact of taxation in the equilibrium contracts is examined. As it
was argued above, even though taxation takes place ex post and contracts
are signed ex ante, any subsidy expected to be paid by the government in
period t = 1 can now be used in the equilibrium contracts. This is enough
to influence the behaviour of all players in the game. Indeed, one can easily
show that any subsidy small enough will be used in the equilibrium contract
by type H in order to borrow more. This will relax type L’s incentive
constraint and allow for more investment to flow into type H’s production
technology. Intuitively, this happens because type H is more willing to give
up any subsidy in the failure state in order to decrease his payment in the
success state, making, that way, her contract less desirable by type L.
In the second step, we will express the equilibrium payoffs of both types
as a function of the tax. This very fact will allow us to compare the payoffs
before and after taxation. Given that pi ts = (1− pi) tf , it is clear that type
L always benefits from the tax system, whereas type H seems to lose at first
sight. Nonetheless, given that, as I argued above, type H is able to borrow
and invest more using the subsidy in the equilibrium contract, it may be the
case that the marginal increase in his production more than offsets what he
pays up in taxes and that way he may also be better off. This is, in fact,
the main idea driving the result.
9If this is not observable then there is no element the contracts can be contingent to
and investment is zero.
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Proposition 1.4.1. For any tax small enough, the equilibrium contracts
are given by:
(XL, Rs,L, Rf,L) = (X
FB
L , R
FB
s,L , R
FB
f,L ),
(XL, Rs,L, Rf,L) = (X
T
L , R
T
s,L,
tf
XTH
)
with XTH and R
T
s,H satisfying:
γLf(X
T
H)−
XTH
piH
= piL
(
γLf(X
FB
L )−
XFBL
piL
)
+
(
(1− piL)
piL
− (1− piH)
piH
)
pi
1− pi ts
(1.5)
piHR
T
s,HX
T
H + (1− piH)tf = XTH
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
As I mentioned previously, type L applies for his perfect information
contract whereas type H applies for a contract with Rf,HXH = tf . This
decreases Rs,H and increases XH . The fact that f(·) is a concave function
is enough to guarantee that an increase in XH increases the net payoff of
type H in the success state. Therefore type H’s payoff is higher if he uses
the subsidy in his equilibrium contract.
Note now that type L is always better off after the tax-subsidy scheme
because he is just cross-subsidised and benefits from the presence of type
H. Therefore, we only need to examine whether there is indeed a set of
parameters, such that the equilibrium payoff of type H, after taxation, is
greater than his equilibrium payoff without taxation. To do so, denote as
XH(ts) the equilibrium investment level of type H as a function of the tax
and note that XH(ts) = X
T
H . XH(ts) is the solution of (1.5) in terms of
XH as a function of the tax ts. As it is shown in Lemma A.5.1 (Appendix
A.5), XH(ts) is a strictly increasing function in some interval. Define now
the following function:
G(ts) = γHf(XH(ts))− XH(ts)
piH
+
(
(1− piH)
piH
pi
1− pi − 1
)
ts (1.6)
which corresponds to the equilibrium payoff of type H in the success state as
a function of the tax. We consider taxes that make the feasibility constraint
bind and therefore the equilibrium payoff of type H in the failure state is
zero.
Because f(·) is a concave function, it should be expected that G(·) is
also concave in ts. In fact, this is the first part proved in Proposition 1.4.2.
In the second part, it is proven that there is a positive tax t˜s that increases
the payoff of type H relative to ts = 0. According to Proposition 1.4.2,there
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is some threshold in pi, denote this as pimin, such that, for any pi ≥ pimin,
G(ts) has always an interior maximiser.
Given the concavity of G(·), there must be a closed interval of taxes that
make type H better off relative to the economy without taxes. However,
the tax should not be very high to make type H’s after taxation less than
his payoff before taxation. Denote this upper limit as ts. Any positive tax
less than ts makes both types better off. Proposition 1.4.2 formalises the
behaviour of G(·) and all the above observations.
Proposition 1.4.2. G(ts) is concave in ts, for any pi ∈ [pimin, piH ], for some
pimin ∈ [piL, piH ], and it attains an interior maximum. There is an interval
of taxes that, when applied, correspond to a separating equilibrium that is
Pareto superior to the no tax equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix A.5.
When pi is high enough, type H may benefit from the tax as well, since
the increase in his production, using the subsidy in the equilibrium contract,
more than offsets what he pays up in the success state. In other words, the
use of the tax relaxes type L’s incentive constraint and this allows more
investment to flow into type H’s technology which is enough to make him
better off as well. Denote as A(ts) the equilibrium aggregate investment
level as a function of the tax. This is now given by the following formula:
A(ts) = λXH(ts) + (1− λ)XFBL .
Corollary 1.4.3. A(ts) is a strictly increasing function in any interval of
taxes that increase welfare.
Perhaps, as we did at the end of Section 1.3, some comparative statics
will help us understand better the intuition of this result. Again, ceteris
paribus, an increase (decrease) in γL will relax (tighten) the incentive con-
straint of type L and allow for more (less) investment to flow into type H’s
technology. This fact will make the use of taxes for Pareto improvements
less (more) frequent. pimin will the higher (lower) than before the increase
in γL occurs.10 In other words, the more (less) diverted are the technologies
of the two types, the less (more) frequent is the government intervention for
Pareto improvements.
10In fact, when γL surpasses a threshold, pimin will be even higher than piRS , which
means that the government cannot improve upon the market allocation when the equilib-
rium is separating in the reference economy.
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§ 1.5 Discussion
1. For simplicity, an elementary two period model with investment, banking
and production was analysed. Furthermore, the analysis was restricted to
only two types and two individual states. The use of two individual states
comes without loss of generality. The argument could go through with more
than two states. On the other hand, the restriction to two types is crucial.
The analysis with more than two types seems much more complicated.
2. The assumption that entrepreneurs own no initial wealth is not important.
The result would remain the same even if entrepreneurs had some initial
wealth in either of the two periods. There is always room for Pareto im-
provements as long as the initial wealth is not enough to give entrepreneurs
the luxury to use it and produce at the efficient (perfect information) level.
Note however that an interesting further result is that optimal taxes are
non-monotonic in the level of initial wealth of entrepreneurs.
3. As it was shown, there is a interval of taxes that increases the welfare
of both types in the economy (high- and low -productivity). An interesting
question is what is right level of taxation. In fact, this is a question that
concerns the policy the government establishes. For instance, in a direct
democracy in which entrepreneurs could vote by majority rule about their
preferred level of taxation, this would depend upon the population of each
type in the economy. From the Median Voter Theorem, high-taxation (t¯s)
would be chosen in case low-productivity entrepreneurs formed the major-
ity (λ < 1/2), whereas moderate taxation (t˜s) in case high-productivity
entrepreneurs formed the majority (λ > 1/2). See Acemoglu and Robinson
(2005) [1].
4. A more realistic model would be one with multiple periods and aggregate
uncertainty, where the productivity of entrepreneurs would depend on the
state of the world. In that more realistic model the role of government in
providing long-term tax plans would become more clear. This is left for
future work.
5. A policy implication of this paper could be that in financial markets,
where asymmetries of information are pervasive, the government (or the
state) must have an active role. Even though, the presence of competitive
banks is necessary to allocate resources in the best way, there are still in-
efficiencies and therefore the government should intervene and redistribute
the wealth using the tax system. As it was shown, the use of the tax sys-
tem could be interpreted as a “stimulus pack” that is necessary to correct
many of the imperfections in the market and result in efficient allocation of
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Strategic Foundations for Efficient Competitive
Markets with Adverse Selection
§ 2.1 Introduction
One of the main open questions in information economics regards the “right”
game-theoretic modelling of efficient competition in markets with asymmet-
ric information. Early contributions in this literature1 highlighted that in
this type of markets, the “usual modeling” of price or/and quantity compe-
tition is not sufficient; equilibria may not exist or may be Pareto dominated.
The present paper builds on the seminal contributions of Myerson [46] and
Maskin and Tirole [43] to construct a novel noncooperative game that pos-
sesses all the nice properties of a competitive market: (i) Equilibria always
exist, (ii) Competitors earn zero expected profits in equilibrium, and (iii)
All equilibrium allocations are interim incentive efficient, in the sense of
Holmstrom and Myerson [30].
To formalise this argument, I employ a generalisation of the standard
insurance market with adverse selection analysed in Rothschild and Stiglitz
[55] and Wilson [59]. A risk-averse, privately informed buyer with a ran-
dom endowment seeks for insurance, which is supplied in the market by
uninformed, risk-neutral sellers. The market takes the following simple ex-
tensive form: Initially, the buyer proposes a set of contracts to all sellers,
who accept or reject. If all sellers reject, there is no trade. Otherwise, all
those sellers who accepted have the right to add a new set of contracts in
the already existing offer. A menu of contracts between the buyer and seller
X is defined as the union of the set of contracts proposed by both parties.
After the buyer observes all the menus of contracts that have been formed
1The most important contributions in this literature Spence [56] and Rothschild and
Stiglitz [55].
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in the market, he2 can choose any of the available contracts contained in any
of the menus. He is restricted to contract with only one seller- i.e. contracts
are exclusive.
I characterise the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of this game.
The well-known Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (or RSW) allocation plays a cru-
cial role in the analysis. It is defined as the allocation that maximises the
payoff of each type of the buyer within the set of incentive compatible allo-
cations that make positive profits, irrespective of the beliefs of the sellers.
The main results of the paper are the following: First, the RSW allocation
is the unique equilibrium allocation when it is contained in the set of interim
incentive efficient allocations.3 Second, any interim incentive efficient allo-
cation that weakly Pareto dominates the RSW allocation is an equilibrium
allocation. Last, only interim incentive efficient allocations can be sustained
as equilibrium allocations in pure strategies.4
The three main elements in the game that drive the result are the follow-
ing: (i) The stage in which the informed buyer proposes a set of contracts.
(ii) The stage in which the competing uninformed sellers have the right to
add new sets of contracts. (iii) The fact that every menu of contracts is the
union of the set of contracts proposed by both parties, and specifically it
must contain the set of contracts proposed by the buyer as an option.
To begin with, following Maskin and Tirole [43], by allowing the informed
party to propose a set of contracts in the first stage, he can always guarantee
his RSW allocation in any equilibrium. In fact, the RSW allocation is
the unique equilibrium allocation, or a “strong solution” in the sense of
Myerson [46], when it is interim incentive efficient. Moreover, this stage
along with the fact that every menu of contracts must contain the set of
contracts proposed by both the buyer and any seller is important for the
existence of equilibria. I show that any interim incentive efficient allocation
that Pareto dominates the RSW allocation is an equilibrium allocation and
corresponds to a “neutral optimum” in the sense of Myerson [46].5 The
intuition behind this result is as follows: Assume that in equilibrium, every
type proposes the same set of contracts that consists of an interim incentive
efficient allocation, and contracts with seller X. In case some other seller
Y proposes any other set of contracts, then according to the equilibrium
strategies, all types contract with seller Y. Note that all types are as well off
as they are by contracting with seller X, because every menu of contracts
2I will use masculine pronounces (he or him) for the buyer and feminine pronounces
(she or her) for the sellers.
3Unless otherwise stated, interim incentive efficiency is defined with respect to the prior
beliefs of the sellers about the type of the buyer.
4“Pure strategies” are strategies where the buyer and sellers do not randomise over
their proposals.
5The RSW allocation is itself a neutral optimum if it is contained in the set of interim
efficient allocations.
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must include the set of contracts proposed by the buyer. In this case, given
that the proposal made by the buyer was interim incentive efficient, any
possible “cream-skimming” offer attracts all types and must therefore be
loss-making. For an appropriate set of off-the-equilibrium path beliefs, no
type has an incentive to deviate either and therefore any interim incentive
efficient allocation that strictly Pareto dominates the RSW allocation can
always be sustained in equilibrium.
Lastly, the stage in which the uninformed sellers can add contracts in
the already existing set of contracts proposed by the buyer is used to exploit
Bertrand-type competition among sellers and eliminate profits and alloca-
tions that are not incentive efficient. Indeed, as I show, competition induces
any equilibrium allocation to be interim incentive efficient.
Related Literature. My work is related to several strands in the liter-
ature. To begin with, the seminal paper on competitive screening markets
with adverse selection is Rothschild and Stiglitz [55]. They analyse an in-
surance market with adverse selection and show that for some parameter
values a “competitive” equilibrium fails to exist.6 Wilson [59] and Riley [53]
place restrictions on the set of possible contracts insurance firms can offer
and show that an equilibrium always exists. Miyazaki [45] extends the idea
of Wilson [59] to a model where insurance firms can offer menus of contracts
(instead of single contracts) and proves that an equilibrium always exists
and the equilibrium allocation is always constrained efficient. From those
two authors, this allocation is often called the Miyazaki-Wilson (or MW)
allocation. Hellwig [29] provides a game-theoretic foundation for the idea
of Wilson [59]. Along with the equilibrium allocation of Wilson [59], he
shows that there is a continuum of other equilibrium allocations.7 Engers
and Fernadez [20] also propose a game with an infinite number of moves to
provide foundations for Riley’s equilibrium allocation. Similarly to Hellwig
[29], a continuum of other allocations can be supported as equilbria. An-
other strand in the literature that analyses the existence of mixed strategy
equilibria in the elementary Bertrand game of Rothschild and Stiglitz [55]
is Rosenthal and Weiss [54], and Dasgupta and Maskin [14, 15].
Netzer and Scheuer [47] propose the following three-stage game: In the
first stage, insurance firms offer menus of contracts. In the second stage, each
firm decides either to stay in the market, or become inactive, in which case it
must pay an exogenously-given withdrawal cost. In the last stage, insurees
select from the set of contracts offered by all active firms. Depending on
6Rothschild and Stiglitz’s [55] definition of competition was vague and it was heavily
criticised. In fact, most of the early contributions in this literature were towards defining
the right notion of competition in screening markets with adverse selection.
7The set of equilibria of Hellwig’s game coincides with the set of equilibria of a signaling
game in which the informed party moves first and can propose a unique contract that is
accepted or rejected by some firm. See also Maskin and Tirole[43] pp. 30.
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the value of the withdrawal cost, there may be an equilibrium, where the
equilibrium allocation coincides with the MW, or not. Mimra and Wambach
[44] examine a game in which in the first stage insurance firms offer menus
of contracts and there is an infinite number of rounds in the second stage
in which each firm can withdraw contracts out of those it has proposed.
Insurees choose from the set of contracts that have not been withdrawn after
the end of this process. Without further restrictions, the equilibrium set of
this game contains every incentive compatible and positive profit allocation.
If, however, there are firms ready to enter the market after all incumbent
firms have made their moves, the equilibrium allocation coincides with MW.
Diasakos and Koufopoulos [18] adopt a similar approach to Hellwig [29] but
introduce endogenous commitment in the first stage. It is claimed that the
MW allocation is the unique equilibrium of the game. However, neither the
action/strategy space nor the contract space are well-defined in this paper.
Asheim and Nilssen [3], Faynzilberg [21] and Picard [48] also examine dif-
ferent games and show that the equilibrium allocation coincides with MW.
For instance, in Asheim and Nilssen [3] it is possible for insurance firms to
renegotiate the contracts they have signed with their customers, imposing
the constraint that they can not discriminate among the different types in
the renegotiation stage. Faynzilberg [21] examines a model in which insur-
ance firms can become insolvent, which introduces an externality between
agents in a contract. Picard [48] examines a similar externality model in
which insurance firms can offer “participating contracts” such that any in-
suree who signs a contract needs to “participate” in the profits of the firm
who offered it. It seems that these models significantly depart from the
original formulation of Rothschild and Stiglitz [55] by imposing hardly jus-
tifiable theoretical assumptions. Moreover, apart from Picard [48], all the
above papers analyse the case of two types. In this paper, I analyse a more
general environment with any finite number of types and states of nature,
and the assumptions imposed are easier to be justified. Moreover, the equi-
librium set of this paper significantly differs from the equilibrium set of all
the aforementioned papers.
The seminal papers on informed principal models are Spence [56], Myer-
son [46] and Maskin and Tirole [43]. Myerson [46] examines a general envi-
ronment in which a principal with private information designs a mechanism
to coordinate his subordinates. The focus of the paper is on the development
of a theory of inscrutable mechanism selection for the principal, and what
axioms desirable mechanisms must satisfy. The principal’s neutral optima
are defined as the smallest possible set of “unblocked” mechanisms. Spence
[56] examines a labour market in which workers can acquire costly educa-
tion before applying for jobs. He shows that a continuum of equilibria exist
most of them Pareto dominated. This multiplicity of equilibria gave rise to
an extensive literature examining possible equilibrium refinements. These
refinements tried to put restrictions on the off-the-equilibrium path beliefs
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that are used to support undesirable equilibria. Among others, the most
i well-known refinements are Kohlberg and Mertens [37], Cho and Kreps
[11] and Banks and Sobel [4]. Maskin and Tirole [43] analyse an informed
principal environment with an extended set of contracts (or mechanisms).
They consider a three stage game (proposal- acceptance/rejection- execu-
tion) and, similarly to this paper, they show that in any equilibrium of the
game, the informed principal can guarantee his RSW allocation in contrast
to Spence [56]. Naturally, a wealth of other allocations that weakly Pareto
dominate the RSW contract can be supported in equilibrium for some set
of beliefs.
Lastly, this paper is also related to the literature in general equilibrium
with adverse selection starting from Prescott and Townsend [50, 49]. Gale
[23, 24, 25], and Dubey and Geanakoplos [19] explore different notions of
competition to prove existence of equilibria, and propose refinements of be-
liefs to pin down the equilibrium set. Bisin and Gottardi [9] also analyse
a Walrasian market with adverse selection and introduce markets for prop-
erty rights that agents can trade. They show that property rights help the
implementation of constrained efficient allocations. Citanna and Siconolfi
[12] also provide a different notion of competition and prove, under mild
restrictions, that for any finite number of types an equilibrium always exists
and it is constrained efficient. In fact, their analysis is closely related to
my paper, even though it is more general and it is applied to a Walrasian
market.
In Section 2.2, I present the model. In Section 2.3, I provide some
preliminary properties of incentive compatible and interim incentive efficient
allocations that prove to be important for the analysis. I also provide an
algorithm to characterise the RSW allocation which plays an important role
in this paper. In Section 2.4, I define the game- i.e. market structure,
contract space and strategies of the players. Moreover, I give a definition
of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In Section 2.5, the main results of the
paper are presented. Lastly, in Section 2.6 some extensions of the model are
suggested.
§ 2.2 The Model
There is a risk-averse buyer with a finite number of possible types t = 1, ..., T .
There is a finite number of possible states ω = 0, 1, ...,Ω. The endowment
of the buyer is risky and is denoted by e = (W − d0,W − d1, ...,W − dΩ),
where d0 = 0 and dω > 0, for any ω ≥ 1. For simplicity, I assume that
the endowment is type-invariant. Type t’s objective probability distribution
over the states is denoted by θt = (θt0, ..., θ
t
Ω). The type of the buyer is his
private information. Assume that
∑Ω
ω=0 θ
t
ωdω <
∑Ω
ω=0 θ
t′
ωdω for any t > t
′;
the expected endowment is increasing in the index of types. The prior
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beliefs about the type of the buyer are λ·0 = {λt0}Tt=1, with
∑T
t=1 λ
t
0 = 1.
Furthermore, I assume that the state of nature is perfectly observable and
verifiable by a court of law. This is the minimum requirement for contracts
to be enforceable. The von Neuman-Morgenstern utility index of all types
is state- and type- independent and is represented by u : X → R, where u
is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Sellers are denoted by i ∈ N , where N ≥ 2 is also the number of sellers
in the market. They are all risk-neutral, expected utility maximisers and
they have enough wealth in order to provide insurance to the buyer if he
wishes so. The number of sellers must be at least two so there is competition
in the market.8 Denote as V i the expected utility of seller i.
An insurance contract is denoted by ψ = (p, b1, ..., bΩ) ∈ RΩ+1+ with p
denoting the premium paid and bω the benefit received by the buyer in state
ω. The space of feasible insurance contracts is given by Ψ = {(p, b1, ..., bΩ) :
0 ≤ p ≤ min{W,W − dω + bω}, bω ≥ 0, p − bω ≤ A¯ for all ω = 0, ...Ω},
where A¯ is an arbitrarily large constant representing the wealth of sellers
in every state. Ψ is a compact set. The expected utility of type t from
insurance contract ψ is given by: U t(ψ) =
∑Ω
ω=0 θ
t
ωu(W − dω − p + bω).
Denote the null contract by ψo = (0, ..., 0) and the status quo utility of
type t as: U t =
∑Ω
ω=0 θ
t
ωu(W −dω). The net expected profit (cost) of insur-
ance contract ψ when taken up by type t is given by pit(ψ) = p−∑Ωω=1 θtωbω.
Sorting Assumption: Whenever ψ, ψ′ are such that U t(ψ) ≥ U t(ψ′)
and U t+1(ψ′) > U t+1(ψ), then U t+h(ψ′) > U t+h(ψ) and U t−h(ψ) > U t−h(ψ′)
for any h ≥ 1.
In words, sorting says that for any two contracts ψ and ψ′, if some type t
weakly prefers ψ to ψ′ and the immediate successor type t+1 strictly prefers
ψ′ to ψ, then all types lower in the rank from type t strictly prefer ψ to ψ′
and those types higher in the rank from type t+ 1 strictly prefer ψ′ and ψ.
Note that when there are only two states of nature Ω = 1, this condition is
vacuously satisfied.
A special case of the model when Ω = 1 is known in the literature of com-
petitive insurance markets with adverse selection as Wilson’s model, from
WIlson [59]. In this model, there are only two states ω = 0, 1 which can
be interpreted as no accident and accident respectively. A graphical illus-
tration of this model is provided in Figure 2.1. In this figure, the benefit
8The assumption of one buyer and many sellers is without loss of generality. Usually in
this type of models, it is assumed that there is a continuum of informed parties (buyers).
The reason I chose to analyse a single buyer model is that it greatly simplifies the notation
and analysis and it is closer to the contract theory framework. The results would remain
the same even if we assumed that there was a continuum of buyers and no aggregate
uncertainty. In this model, insurance would be provided by sellers who could freely start
operating insurance firms.
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Figure 2.1: A graphical illustration of Wilson’s model for T = 2.
is represented on the horizontal axis and the premium on the vertical axis.
The indifference curve of type t is labeled by It. In the figure, there are only
two possible types. Although not depicted, the profit functions are upward
straight lines. The zero-profit line for type t is the line with slope θt1 passing
through the origin. Because of the single-crossing property, the indifference
curve of type t is always steeper than the one of type t+ 1 for any b. Utility
increases as we move south-east and profit increases as we move north-west
for all types. We can easily establish that all indifference curves are tan-
gential to the zero-profit lines at the same point bt1 = d1 (the point of full
insurance), for all t with a higher premium for the high-risk types.9 This is
because the utility indexes are type- and state- independent.
Definition: An allocation ψ· = {ψt}Tt=1 is a set of contracts one for
each type of the buyer. Denote by Ψ ⊆ ΨT×(Ω+1)+ the set of all feasible
allocations.
Definition: Π(ψ·) =
∑T
t=1 λ
t
0pi
t(ψt) denotes the expected profit of al-
9For a detailed exposition of Wilson’s model see Jehle and Reny [34].
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location ψ·.
Definition: An allocation ψ· = {ψt}Tt=1 is incentive compatible (IC) if
and only if: U t(ψt) ≥ U t(ψt′), ∀ t, t′. Denote by ΨIC ⊆ Ψ the set of all
incentive compatible allocations.
Definition: An allocation ψ· = {ψt}Tt=1 is interim individually rational
(IR) if and only if: (i) U t(ψt) ≥ U t, ∀ t = 1, ..., T , and, (ii) Π(ψ·) ≥ 0.
Denote the set of all incentive compatible and interim individually rational
allocations as ΨICR ⊆ ΨIC .
Definition: An alocation ψ· = {ψt}Tt=1 ∈ ΨICR weakly Pareto domi-
nates allocation ψˆ· = {ψˆt}Tt=1 ∈ ΨICR if and only U t(ψt) ≥ U t(ψˆt) for all
t = 1, ..., T with the inequality being strict for at least one t. Strict Pareto
dominance is defined by taking all inequalities to be strict.
Definition: An allocation ψ· = {ψt}Tt=1 is a weak (strong) interim in-
centive efficient (IE) allocation, in the sense of Holmstrom and Myerson [30],
if and only if ψ· ∈ ΨICR, and there exists no other ψ˜· = {ψ˜t}Tt=1 ∈ ΨICR
that strictly (weakly) Pareto dominates ψ·. Denote by ΨWIE the set of weak
incentive efficient allocations and ΨSIE the set of strong incentive efficient
allocations.
Note that interim efficiency is defined with respect to the buyer’s payoff
and the prior beliefs of the sellers. In fact, an incentive efficient allocation
maximises the welfare of all types of the buyer guaranteeing at the same
time that no seller is worse off than not participating in any transaction
with the buyer. The efficiency concept demands only that allocations are
individually rational on average and not necessarily ex post individually
rational. Evidently, ΨSIE ⊆ ΨWIE ⊆ ΨICR.
§ 2.3 Some Preliminary Properties of Incentive
Compatible Allocations
In this section, I provide some preliminary properties of the set of incentive
compatible allocations that will prove useful in the analysis. Note that a
special case of the model is the Rothschild and Stiglitz [55] model, where
T = 2 and Ω = 1. Type 1 is the high-risk type and type 2 is the low-risk
type. To better illustrate the argument, I will sometimes employ this spe-
cial case. Figure 2.2 provides a graphical illustration of the Rothschild and
Stiglitz [55] model. In the same figure, we can also see the well-known Roth-
schild and Stiglitz [55] allocation, often called the Rothschild and Stiglitz
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Figure 2.2: The RSW allocation for the special case of T = 2 and Ω = 1.
Following Maskin and Tirole [43], the generalisation of the Rothschild
and Stiglitz [55] allocation will be called from now on the RSW allocation;
an acronym for Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson.10
Definition: The RSW allocation is denoted by ψ·RSW = {ψtRSW }Tt=1
and can be derived by solving the following recursive program:
Program R(1): max
ψ1
U1(ψ1) subject to
pi1(ψ1) ≥ 0
and for every t = 2, ..., T :
Program R(t): max
ψt
U t(ψt) subject to
U t−1(ψt−1RSW ) ≥ U t−1(ψt)
pit(ψt) ≥ 0
For each t = 1, ..., T , the constraint set of Program R(t) is a closed
subset of a compact set and therefore is compact. Therefore a solution
10See also Maskin and Tirole [43] for more on RSW allocations.
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always exists. It is easy to show that, with strictly increasing utility in-
dexes, for each t = 1, ..., T all constraints are satisfied with equality. In
fact, for t = 1, ψ1RSW = (
∑Ω
ω=1 θ
t
ωdω, d1, ..., dΩ); the lowest in the rank
type’s RSW contract coincides with his “perfect-information” contract. For
each type t = 2, ..., T , ψtRSW provides less than full insurance and moreover,
U t(ψtRSW ) > U
t(ψt−1RSW ). Note that because of the sorting assumption, we
can neglect global incentive constraints and solve each program using the in-
centive constraint for the upward-adjacent type. Because of strict concavity
of the utility index, U t(ψtRSW ) > U
t
The RSW allocation plays a significant role in this paper as well as in
any competitive market with adverse selection. This is because it is the only
incentive compatible allocation that maximises the utility of all types and it
is also ex post individually rational. In the spirit of Myerson [46], the RSW
allocation is a “safe” or incentive compatible “type-by-type” allocation (or
mechanism). A safe mechanism is one which would be incentive compatible
even if the sellers knew the type of the buyer.
The following lemma is a preliminary result which will be extensively
used in all the lemmas that follow:
Lemma 2.3.1. For every ψ·, ψ˜· ∈ ΨIC , such that ψ˜ strictly Pareto dom-
inates ψ·, there exist 0 <  < 1 and ψ¯· ∈ ΨIC that also strictly Pareto
dominates ψ· and Π(ψ¯·) > Π(ψ·) + (1− )Π(ψ˜·).
Proof: Take ψ·, ψ˜· ∈ ΨIC , such that ψ˜ strictly Pareto dominates ψ·.
Consider the following random allocation: Every type t is offered a contract
that after the realisation of the state of nature ω, there is a lottery which
with probability  pays −pt + btω and with probability 1− , −p˜t + b˜tω. The
expected utility of type t from this random contract can be written as:
U t =
∑Ω
ω=1 θ
t
ω[u(W −dω−pt+ btω) + (1− )u(W −dω− p˜t+ b˜tω)]. For every
0 <  < 1 and every ω we can find −p¯t + b¯tω (the certainty equivalent) such
that
u(W − dω − pt + btω) + (1− )u(W − dω − p˜t + b˜tω) = u(W − dω − p¯t + b¯tω)
Because of the strict concavity of the utility function and by Jensen’s
inequality,
W − dω − p¯t + b¯tω < (W − dω − pt + btω) + (1− )(W − dω − p˜t + b˜tω)
or
p¯t − b¯tω > (pt − btω) + (1− )(p˜t − b˜tω)
Therefore,
pit(ψ¯t) ≡ p¯t−
Ω∑
ω=1
θtω b¯
t
ω > (p
t−
Ω∑
ω=1
θtωb
t
ω)+(1−)(p˜t−
Ω∑
ω=1
θtω b˜
t
ω) ≡ pit(ψt)+(1−)pit(ψ˜t)
2.3. Some Preliminary Properties of Incentive Compatible Allocations 27
Summing up over t:
T∑
t=1
λt0pi
t(ψ¯t) > 
T∑
t=1
λt0pi
t(ψt) + (1− )
T∑
t=1
λt0pi
t(ψ˜t)
or
Π(ψ¯·) > Π(ψ·) + (1− )Π(ψ˜·)
Since ψ·, ψ˜· ∈ ΨIC , for any , the random allocation (⊗ψ·, 1− ⊗ ψ˜·) is
also incentive compatible or (⊗ψ·, 1−⊗ψ˜·) ∈ ΨIC . This necessarily means
that ψ¯· ∈ ΨIC . Moreover, for any 0 <  < 1, U t(ψt) < U t(ψ¯t) < U t(ψ˜t),
therefore ψ¯· strictly Pareto dominates ψ·. Q.E.D.
Many of the proofs will be based on the following important property of
IC allocations:
Lemma 2.3.2. For every ψ· ∈ ΨICR and δ > 0 with Π(ψ·) > 0, there exists
ψ¯· ∈ ΨICR that strictly Pareto dominates ψ· and Π(ψ¯·) > Π(ψ·)− δ.
Proof: Take allocation ψ· ∈ ΨICR with Π(ψ·) > 0. Consider the
following complete-risk-pooling allocation ψ˜·, where ψ˜t = (p˜, d1, ..., dΩ) for
each t = 1, ..., T and p˜ <
∑T
t=1 λ
t
0
∑Ω
ω=1 θ
t
ωdω. From Lemma 2.3.1, there
exists 0 <  < 1 and ψ¯· that strictly Pareto dominates ψ· such that Π(ψ¯·) >
Π(ψ·) + (1− )Π(ψ˜·). For δ = (1− )[Π(ψ·)−Π(ψ˜·)],  and p˜ appropriately
chosen, we obtain the result. Q.E.D.
If we recall the definition of incentive efficiency, it is not hard to see that
given risk-neutrality on behalf of the sellers, and Lemma 2.3.2, every (weak)
incentive efficient allocation must be zero-profit.
Corollary 2.3.3. Every ψ· ∈ ΨWIE is such that Π(ψ·) = 0.
Another important property of incentive compatible allocations is the
following:
Lemma 2.3.4. For every ψ· ∈ ΨICR, with Π(ψ·) = 0 and ψ· /∈ ΨSIE, there
exists ψ¯· ∈ ΨICR that strictly Pareto dominates ψ· with Π(ψ¯·) > 0.
Proof: Case 1. Assume first that ψ· /∈ ΨWIE , with Π(ψ·) = 0. By
definition, there exists ψ˜· ∈ ΨWIE that strictly Pareto dominates ψ·. From
Corollary 2.3.3, Π(ψ˜·) = 0. From Lemma 2.3.1, there exists ψ¯· ∈ ΨIC that
strictly Pareto dominates ψ· with Π(ψ¯·) > Π(ψ·) + (1− )Π(ψ˜·) = 0.
Case 2. Assume that ψ· ∈ ΨWIE but ψ· /∈ ΨSIE . There exists ψ˜· ∈
ΨSIE that weakly Pareto dominates ψ·. Let the set of types whose utility
remains the same in both allocations be T1 and those whose utility is strictly
higher under ψ˜· be T2. By following the same logic as in the proof of Lemma
2.3.1, we can find ψ¯· ∈ ΨIC with U t(ψ¯t) > U t(ψt) for all t ∈ T2 and
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U t(ψ¯t) = U t(ψt), for all t ∈ T1. Moreover, Π(ψ¯·) > 0. From Lemma 2.3.2,
for any δ > 0, there exists ψˆ· ∈ ΨIC that strictly Pareto dominates ψ¯· and
Π(ψ˜·) > Π(ψ¯·)− δ ≥ 0, for δ small enough. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2.3.5. The sets of strict and weak incentive efficient allocations
coincide, or: ΨSIE = ΨWIE.
§ 2.4 The Game
In this section, I describe the interaction of economic agents in the market.
I specify a noncooperative game- i.e. a market mechanism- in which all
economic participants meet and exchange contracts. The most important
element is that all agents are allowed to offer any set of contracts they wish.
In the market, Nature moves first and decides the type of the buyer.
This is neither observable nor verifiable by any third party. Then, the buyer
makes a first proposal to all sellers in the form of a set of a finite number of
contracts.11 Denote the set of contracts proposed by the buyer as µ·b. After
the buyer’s proposal, each one of the sellers decides whether to participate
in the game or not (accept or reject the proposal). Any seller who decides
to participate can propose a new set of a finite number of contracts. Denote
the set of contracts proposed by seller i as µ·i. A menu of contracts between
the buyer and some seller i is defined as the union of the proposals of the
set of contracts proposed by the buyer and seller i. Denote such a menu
as mi = (µ·i, µ
·
b). The buyer has access to any menu traded in the market.
Note that one of the most important features of the game is that every menu
of contracts between the buyer and seller i must always includes as options
both the buyer’s as well as the seller’s proposals. If any of the sellers decides
not to participate, then she cannot make any proposal and she is excluded
from the game irreversibly.
An allocation can be formed by combining contracts from all (or some)
menus of contracts in the market or out of a single menu. Evidently, every
equilibrium allocation must be incentive compatible. The buyer can sign
only one contract with only one seller. This is one of the most common and
most important assumptions used in this literature. Relaxing this assump-
tion leads to common agency problems.12 Denote the “winning” seller- i.e.
the seller who contracts with the buyer- by i∗.
To formally describe the timing of events, the market is formulated as
an extensive form game, denoted as Γe. To simplify notation, denote as ajk,
j = {N, b, i}, k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, an action from nature, the buyer, or seller i in
stage k:
11For technical reasons any set of contracts can only contain a finite number of contracts.
This is without loss of generality.
12For more on common agency models, see Martimort [40] and Stole [58].
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Stage 0 : Nature decides the type of the buyer: aN0 ∈ {1, ..., T}.
Stage 1 : The buyer proposes a set of contracts ab1 = µ
·
b.
Stage 2 : Each seller i ∈ N accepts or rejects the proposal of the buyer,
ai2 = {1, 0}, for all i ∈ N . N˙= {set of sellers who accepted}. If N˙ = {∅}, the
game ends with payoffs V i = 0, for each i ∈ N and U t for type t = 1, ..., T .
If N˙ 6= {∅}, the game moves to Stage 3. For each i /∈ N˙ , V i = 0.
Stage 3 : Each seller i ∈ N˙ proposes a new set of contracts ai3 = µ·i. A
menu of contracts between the buyer and some seller i is formed by taking
the union of the proposals of the set of contracts proposed by the buyer and
seller i. Denote such a menu as mi = (µ·i, µ
·
b).
Stage 4 : The buyer signs one of the available contracts ab4 ∈ ∪i∈N˙mi. If
ab4 = ψ
t′ , for some t′, the game ends with payoffs U t(ψt′) for the buyer of
type t, V i
∗
= pit(ψs) for seller i∗.
A strategy for the buyer is denoted by σb and consists of a proposal of
a set of contracts µ·b in Stage 1 and, for any possible menu of contracts, a
choice of a contract proposed by the sellers or a contract out of his proposed
set of contracts in Stage 4. A strategy for seller i is denoted by σi and,
for any possible proposal of a set of contracts by the buyer, consists of a
decision (accept/ reject) in Stage 2 and, a proposal of a new set of contracts
in Stage 3 (conditional on acceptance). A mixed strategy is defined by
taking probability measures over the set of pure strategies.
After Stage 1 each seller observes an action from the buyer. This action
may disclose some information regarding the buyer’s type. Therefore, all
sellers revise their beliefs appropriately after the buyer’s action. The com-
mon posterior beliefs of all sellers after Stage 1 are denoted as λ·1 = {λt1}Tt=1.
I will be interested in the perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of the overall
game. Given the dynamic nature of the game and the fact that sellers take
actions after observing a move from the buyer, this is a plausible assumption.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a vector of strategies for the buyer and
all the sellers and a vector of beliefs at each information set such that (i)
the strategies of the players are optimal at every node of the game tree
(sequential rationality), (ii) interim beliefs about the type of the buyer are
the same in nodes where he does not take an action and are derived by
Bayes’ rule from the strategies of the players (Bayesian updating).
§ 2.5 Equilibria and their Properties
We can now turn our interest to the set PBE of game Γe. In Section 2.3,
we characterised properties of allocations with no reference to any game or
market mechanism. In fact, the main goal of this paper is to examine the
relationship between incentive efficient allocations and the set of equilibrium
allocations for game Γe. We will only be interested in the set of pure strategy
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PBE, refraining from examining strategies in which agents randomise over
pure strategies.
First, note that Game Γe has a strong signaling feature.13 This is because
the informed party offers a set of contracts which may perhaps reveal some
of his information to the uninformed parties. In fact, the game is an enriched
“Informed Principal Game”, in which the buyer is the informed principal
and the sellers are the subordinates. The difference from the usual informed
principal model of Myerson [46] and Maskin and Tirole [43] is that the
subordinates have the right to influence the mechanism with their offers.
Another significant observation is that Myerson’s [46] inscrutability principle
holds in game Γe. According to this principle, the informed party (buyer)
never needs to disclose his type with his proposal, because he can always
build such communication into the process of the mechanism itself. What
it is meant by this is that for every possible equilibrium in which there is
partial revelation of information- e.g. an equilibrium in which partitions of
different types offer different sets of contracts- there is another equilibrium
in which all types offer the same set of contracts and the equilibrium payoffs
are equivalent.14 Therefore, there is no loss of generality to concentrate on
possible equilibria in which all types offer the same set of contracts and no
belief updating takes place in Stage 2 of the game, or: λ·1 = λ·0. Given this
simplifications, the first result of the paper is stated as follows:
Proposition 2.5.1. If ψˆ· is an equilibrium allocation of game Γe, then
Π(ψˆ·) = 0.
13However, in pure signaling games, there exist pooling equilibria, in which no infor-
mation is transmitted from the informed to the uninformed parties, as well as separating
equilibria in which all relevant information is transmitted. In these games nonetheless,
interaction among the uninformed and the informed parties ends after the transmission of
this information. Moreover, the mechanisms that are allowed to be traded in these models
are very limited- e.g. in Spence [56]; every worker can propose only one contract. Our
game differs from these models, because the uninformed parties have the right to make
a proposal of contracts to the informed party and the informed party can offer richer
mechanisms. Therefore, the set of equilibria has a different structure.
14Note that full revelation is never a possible equilibrium scenario. The intuition behind
this result is the following: Assume (for simplicity) that there exists an equilibrium in
which every different type makes a distinct proposal and his type is fully revealed. It
must necessarily be (because of sequential rationality) that the proposal of any type must
be utility maximising for this type (or incentive compatible). In other words no type must
have an incentive to propose something that some other type proposes in equilibrium.
Given that the buyer’s type becomes publicly known after his proposal, in the continuation
of the game, and because of Bertrand competition, at least one seller must propose to this
type a menu that contains as a contract, the contract that this type would get under
complete information. Otherwise, the equilibrium fails to be sequentially rational. Note
that that with state and type independent utility functions the first-best contract of type
t is (
∑Ω
ω=1 θ
t
ωdω, d1, ..., dΩ). Every type is perfectly insured. Because by assumption∑Ω
ω=1 θ
T
ωdω <
∑Ω
ω=1 θ
t
ωdω for any t = 1, ..., T − 1x, all types strictly prefer the first-
best contract of type T over their contract. Therefore, there is a contradiction with the
assumption that the first initial offer was utility maximising for all types.
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Proof: It is trivial to see that there cannot exist a strictly negative
profit equilibrium allocation. Assume therefore that there exists an equilib-
rium allocation ψˆ· such that Π(ψˆ·) > 0. Assume, for simplicity, that all sell-
ers have accepted the offer of the buyer: N˙ ≡ N . One can easily prove that
there exists at least one seller i′ ∈ N such that Vˆ i′ < Π(ψˆ·), where Vˆ i′ is the
equilibrium payoff of Seller i′. From Lemma 2.3.1, for any δ > 0, there exists
ψ¯· that strictly Pareto dominates ψˆ· and Π(ψ¯·) > Π(ψˆ·)− δ > 0. Therefore,
there exists δ′ (arbitrarily small) such that Π(ψ¯·) > Π(ψˆ·)− δ′ = Vˆ i′ which
simply means that seller i′ can increase his payoff by proposing µ¯·i′ = ψ¯
·
such that a new menu m¯i
′
= (µˆ·b, µ¯
·
i′) is formed. In this case, all types must
contract with seller i′, given that ψ¯· strictly Pareto dominates ψˆ·, otherwise
the equilibrium fails to be sequentially rational- an immediate contradic-
tion. i′ makes strictly higher profits than when offering allocation ψˆ· which
contradicts the thesis that ψˆ· is an equilibrium allocation. Q.E.D.
This result highlights the competitive identity of the game. Because of
the presence of many competing sellers equilibria are compatible with the
zero-profit condition (due to constant-returns-to-scale). The following result
is the first of the two main results of the paper:
Theorem 2.5.2. If ψˆ· is an equilibrium allocation of game Γe, then ψˆ· ∈
ΨSIE.
Proof: Assume ψˆ· /∈ ΨSIE is an equilibrium allocation. From Propo-
sition 2.5.1, we know that Π(ψˆ·) = 0. Assume, again for simplicity, that all
sellers have accepted the offer of the buyer: N˙ ≡ N , and all of them make
zero profits in this equilibrium. Because ψˆ· /∈ ΨSIE , from Lemma 2.3.4,
there exists ψ¯· ∈ ΨICR that strictly Pareto dominates ψˆ· and Π(ψ¯·) > 0.
Therefore, at least one seller i′ can offer allocation ψ¯· and all types must
contract with seller i′ because of sequential rationality. This contradicts the
thesis that all types sign a contract from allocation ψˆ·. Therefore, if there
exists an equilibrium then the only possible equilibrium allocation must be
such that ψˆ· ∈ ψSIE . Q.E.D.
Not only equilibrium allocations must be zero-profit, but also, from The-
orem 2.5.2, there cannot exist even weakly Pareto dominated equilibrium al-
locations. The stage where sellers can propose contracts is critical for both
Proposition 2.5.1 and Theorem 2.5.2; it allows Bertrand-type competition
among sellers in order to eliminate any strictly positive profits and to force
allocations to be SIE. This seems to be an important departure from all the
relevant papers in the literature since in their main parts, they are unable
to exclude allocations that are not interim incentive efficient.
The following proposition is the third result concerning the set of equilib-
rium allocations of game Γe.15 It places a minimum bound in the equilibrium
15Note that the equilibrium allocation may be a combination of contracts from µ·b and µ
·
i
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payoff of each type.
Proposition 2.5.3. If ψˆ· is an equilibrium allocation of game Γe, then
U t(ψˆt) ≥ U t(ψtRSW ), for all t = 1, ..., T .
Proof: Assume that there exists an equilibrium in which the equi-
librium allocation ψˆ· is such that U t(ψˆt) < U t(ψtRSW ) for some t. From
Proposition 2.5.1, we know that Π(ψˆ·) = 0. Assume that the set of sellers
participating is N˙ . Take δ > 0 small enough. Let the buyer of type t pro-
pose the following set of contracts in Stage 1: µ·b = ψ˜
·
b such that ψ˜
·
b is the
solution of the perturbed recursive program:
Program R˜(1) : max
ψ1
U1(ψ1) subject to
pi1(ψ1) ≥ δ
and for every t = 2, ..., T :
Program R˜(t) : max
ψt
U t(ψt) subject to
U t−1(ψ˜t−1) ≥ U t−1(ψt) + δ
pit(ψt) ≥ δ
Allocation ψ˜·b is strictly incentive compatible- every type strictly prefers
his contract over the contract of any other type- and therefore the buyer
will choose the right contract out of this allocation in Stage 4. Given that,
allocation ψ˜·b makes strictly positive profit regardless of the posterior beliefs
λ·0 of the sellers. Thus, at least one seller i ∈ N˙ has to accept the proposal
of the buyer, otherwise the equilibrium fails to be sequentially rational.
Therefore, at any continuation of the game, type t’s payoff is at least U t(ψ˜t).
This contradicts the initial hypothesis that ψˆ· was an equilibrium allocation.
Because this is true for any δ > 0, a lower bound in the utility of any type
t is U t(ψtRSW ). Q.E.D.
Corollary 2.5.4. If ψ·RSW ∈ ΨSIE, then ψ·RSW is the unique equilibrium
allocation.
Proposition 2.5.3 (and its proof) is similar to Proposition 5 of Maskin
and Tirole [43]. There, it is proven that when the informed party is the one
who makes the contract offer, he can always guarantee his RSW allocation in
any equilibrium provided that the contract space is rich enough.16 Maskin
for any i ∈ N˙ . This is the case for example when the RSW allocation is interim incentive
efficient. The equilibrium allocation must always be incentive compatible. There exist
equilibria in which some seller serves all types.
16By rich enough, Maskin and Tirole [43] consider the space which contains a contract
for every type of the seller.
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and Tirole [43] examine a general informed principal model as a three-stage
noncooperative game (contract proposal- acceptance/rejection- execution).
The model in this paper differs in at least two respects from Maskin and
Tirole [43]. First, in this paper, there are multiple uninformed parties who
compete for the same informed party in exclusive contracts, unlike Maskin
and Tirole [43] where there is only one informed and one uninformed party.
Moreover, after the buyer’s (the informed party’s) proposal, the sellers (un-
informed parties) have the right to also propose a set of contracts. This
dramatically changes the set of equilibria as it is proven in Proposition 2.5.1
and Theorem 2.5.2. In fact, in Γe only weak incentive efficient allocations
can be supported in equilibrium, unlike Maskin and Tirole [43], where any
allocation that weakly Pareto dominates the RSW allocation can be sup-
ported as an equilibrium allocation for some set of beliefs.
In the spirit of Myerson [46], the RSW allocation is the only “strong
solution” when it is interim incentive efficient. A strong solution is an allo-
cation that is safe and undominated. When a strong solution exists, then it
must always be the equilibrium allocation.
Besides their importance, Proposition 2.5.1 and Theorem 2.5.2 cannot
have a bite unless we prove that equilibria exist for all possible parameter
values. In Proposition 2.5.3, it is proven that the RSW allocation is an
equilibrium allocation if and only if it is incentive efficient relative to the
prior beliefs. Note that the same results hold even in the elementary model
examined by Rothschild and Stiglitz [55]. However, one of the main diffi-
culties in these environments is that incentive efficiency sometimes requires
cross-subsidisation. This simply means that to increase the payoff of some
type(s), some contracts must become loss-making- i.e. to violate the ex post
individual rationality constraints of the sellers. In fact, that was the initial
problem pointed out by Rothschild and Stiglitz [55], who showed that in this
case, there are robust regions in which a pure strategy equilibrium fails to
exist. According to their definition of competition, some new seller (insur-
ance firm in their jargon) could enter and “skim the cream” in the market,
by attracting only the low-risk types, creating losses to other active sellers.
Therefore the main interest is to examine whether pure strategy equilibria
exist even when the RSW is not incentive efficient. Note that, in this range
of parameters, Maskin and Tirole [43] find a continuum of equilibrium allo-
cations; some of them strictly Pareto dominated. However, as we showed in
Theorem 2.5.2, this is never the case in game Γe; Bertrand-type competition
eliminates any strictly positive profits and forces equilibrium allocations to
be incentive efficient. It only remains to show that equilibria always exist
when the RSW allocation does not belong to the set of incentive efficient
allocations.
The key to construct equilibria is to notice that every seller who accepts
in Stage 2 of the game, implicitly accepts to offer every contract contained
in the set of contracts proposed by the buyer. Noticing so allows us to con-
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struct equilibria in which the buyer always offers a stong incentive efficient
allocation that strictly Pareto dominates the RSW allocation and some seller
accepts. Cream-skimming is not possible in Γe because there are strategies
for the buyer according to which all types contract with any entrant trying
to skim the cream, and because of the nature of the set of contracts that
have been proposed by the buyer, any entrant makes negative profits. The
following theorem is the last main result of this paper.
Theorem 2.5.5. If ψˆ· ∈ ΨSIE and it strictly Pareto dominates ψ·RSW then
it is an equilibrium allocation of game Γe.
Proof: Consider the following candidate equilibrium strategies: “The
buyer, regardless his type, proposes a set contracts µˆ·b such that µˆ
·
b = ψˆ
·,
allocation ψˆ· ∈ ΨSIE and strictly Pareto dominates ψ·RSW . Agent i = 1
accepts the proposal and proposes µˆ·1 = ψ·o- i.e. all the contracts being
the null contracts. No other seller accepts the proposal. The menu formed
between the buyer and seller 1 is denoted by mˆ1 = (µˆ·b, µˆ
·
1). If the buyer
proposes any different set of contracts, the posterior beliefs are updated to
λ˜·1. If any other seller i′ ∈ N/{1} decides to enter the market and makes a
proposal, then all types contract with seller i′.”
First, recall that any seller who enters the market has to include in any
menu the set of contracts proposed by the buyer. Let us examine first all the
possible subgames resulting after the buyer’s “equilibrium proposal”. If no
seller, other than seller 1, enters the market, then given that allocation ψˆ· is
incentive compatible, each type t = 1, ..., T gains maximal payoff by sticking
to contract ψˆt in Stage 4. Because ψˆ· ∈ ΨSIE , by Corollary 2.3.3, Π(ψˆ·) = 0
so seller 1 is indifferent between participating in the game or not. Given the
equilibrium strategies, no other seller has an incentive to enter the market
and offer a different set of contracts (form a different menu). For assume
not. Let seller 2 form a new menu m˜2 = (µˆ·b, µ˜
·
2) where µ˜
·
2 contains contracts
that are strictly preferred by some types and makes strictly positive profits.
Given the equilibrium strategies, all types must contract with seller 2. This
is sequentially rational for all types since, by construction of the game,
they can always guarantee by any entrant the menu of contracts they have
proposed in Stage 1. Because of Lemma 2.3.2, and given that ψˆ· ∈ ΨSIE , any
allocation that Pareto dominates ψˆ· must make strictly negative expected
profits which contradicts the thesis that seller 2 can make strictly positive
profits by forming a new menu.
All that is left is to construct appropriate beliefs λ˜·1, and continuation
payoffs such that U˜ t ≤ U t(ψtRSW ) for all t = 1, ..., T . Consider the follow-
ing candidate off-the-equilibrium path beliefs λ˜·1 = (1, 0, ...., 0). For these
posterior beliefs, no set of contracts can be accepted by any of the sell-
ers if it contains an element (contract) ψ˜ such that U1(ψ˜) > U1(ψ1RSW ).
This is because it must necessarily make negative profits under λ˜·1. From
the definition of ψ1RSW from Program RSW, under the sorting assumption,
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U t(ψtRSW ) > U
t(ψ1RSW ) for any t = 2, ..., T . This means that after a de-
viation by the buyer of any type, at any continuation of the game given
beliefs λ˜·1, the maximal payoff any type can approximate is the payoff he
could have from ψ1RSW , which by definition is worse than the equilibrium
payoff under ψˆ· given that the latter by assumption strictly Pareto domi-
nates ψ·RSW . Q.E.D.
An equilibrium always exists because of the nature of the menus of con-
tracts allowed in the market. The key fact is that each menu of contracts
must always include the set of contracts the buyer proposed in the first
stage of the game. This is enough to create a credible threat for potential
entrants who try to skim the cream in the market. Any equilibrium alloca-
tion of game Γe is an Undominated Mechanism in the sense of Myerson [46].
No type can ever block such an allocation.
In Figure 2.3, a candidate equilibrium allocation is illustrated for Wil-
son’s model for Ω = 1. This allocation provides full insurance to both types,
strictly Pareto dominates the RSW allocation and makes zero-expected prof-
its on average.
p
b
O d1
ψ1RSW
p =θ11b1
p =θ 21b1
ψ 2RSW
ψ
∧
Figure 2.3: A candidate equilibrium for the special case of T = 2 and
Ω = 1.
36
Chapter 2. Strategic Foundations for Efficient Competitive Markets with
Adverse Selection
§ 2.6 Extensions
In this section, I show how the results extend to other similar environments
with adverse selection.
2.6.1 Managerial Compensation
A manager with a finite number of possible types t = 1, ..., T bargains with
potential identical employers. The productivity of the manager depends on
his type θt with θt > θt
′
, for any t > t′. A manager of type t has utility
function: ut(m, q) = y− 1θt c(q), where y is money and q is observable output.
Assume that c′ > 0, c′′ > 0, limz→∞ c′(z) = 0, limz→0 c′(z) = ∞. All
employers have the same linear utility function by employing a manager of
type t: θtq− y. A contract is denoted by ψ = (y, q) ∈ X ⊂ R2+. Everything
else is defined similarly to the insurance model.
2.6.2 Credit Markets
There are two periods and one consumption-investment good which is perish-
able.17 An entrepreneur has a finite number of possible types: t = 1, ..., T .
His initial wealth is zero but he owns a stochastic investment technology
which take the following form: By investingX units of the consumption good
in period zero an entrepreneur of type t can realize γtf(X) units in period
one with probabiliy θt and zero otherwise. Assume thatf(·) is twice differ-
entiable, strictly increasing, concave and satisfies Inada conditions namely
limz→0 f ′(z) =∞ and limz→∞ f ′(z) = 0. f(0) = 0.
Types are ranked in the following way: θT > ... > θ1, γT < .... < γ1 but
θTγT > ... > θ1γ1.
Assume that only the state of nature is observable by any outsider and
verifiable by a court of law. That way, entrepreneur’s type is not observable,
before or after production has taken place, by either the banks or the gov-
ernment. Lastly, all entrepreneurs are risk neutral and indifferent between
consuming in period any period.
Bankers are risk-neutral and they have enough wealth to finance the
entrepreneur. A loan contract takes the following form: (X,Rs, Rf ), where
X is the amount of loan, Rs is the per unit of loan payment in case of success
and Rf is the per unit of loan payment in case of failure. The rest is similar
to the basic insurance model.
17The economy is similar to that of Martin (2009) [41] with the difference that en-
trepreneurs do not possess any initial wealth at the time of contracting. This is only for
simplicity and without loss of generality.
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2.6.3 The Informed Seller Model
There is one informed seller endowed with one object. There is a large
number of potential buyers who are interested in acquiring the object at
some price. Assume for simplicity that there are no financial constraints.
The seller has a finite number of types t = 1, ..., T . In addition, he can
invest in some technology in order to improve the quality of the object if
he wishes so. Investment is perfectly observable and verifiable and therefore
it can be used as a contractible variable along with the selling price. The
preferences of the seller of type t are represented by: U t(p, y), where p is
money (the selling price) and y investment. U t is strictly increasing in p
and strictly decreasing in y. Moreover, assume that the sorting assumption
holds. Buyers have linear preferences represented by V t(p, y) = θty − p.
θt is the marginal valuation of a buyer if he trades with a seller of type
t. Assume, furthermore, that θt is increasing in t, so marginally, the buyer
always prefers to trade with a seller of higher type. A contract in this model
is denoted by ψ = (p, y) and specifies a price for the object and a level of
investment.18 The rest is similar to the basic insurance model.
§ 2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I studied a market with multiple competing uninformed risk-
neutral sellers, one informed risk-averse buyer with a risky endowment and
common values. The buyer could be any of a finite number of types and this
was his private information. I proposed a game form (market mechanism or
platform) to model the interaction among the buyer and sellers. In partic-
ular, I allowed the buyer to propose a set of contracts in the first stage and
the sellers to also propose sets of contracts if they accepted the offer. After
the proposals, a menu of contracts was formed between the buyer and each
one of the sellers who decided to participate consisting of all the contracts
proposed in both sets. The buyer had the discretion to choose any contract
out of any mechanism in the market.
The main findings of the paper could be summed up as follows: First,
the RSW allocation is an equilibrium allocation if and only if it is interim
incentive efficient. Indeed, it is the unique strong solution. Second, only
interim incentive efficient allocations can be possible equilibrium allocations
of the game studied. Last, any interim incentive efficient allocation that
strictly Pareto dominates the RSW allocation can be an equilibrium alloca-
tion and it corresponds to a neutral optimum. Surprisingly, no refinement
was needed in out-of-equilibrium beliefs to eliminate unwanted equilibria.
18Note that in case there is no technology to improve the quality of the object, this model
is identical to Akerlof’s [2] lemons market. Even in this case, the market mechanism is
able to produce only efficient allocations.
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As I claimed, the extensive form game is not restricted only to the basic
insurance model but could potentially extend in other competitive models
such as managerial compensation models, credit models, franchising models,
informed seller models etc.
Part
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39

- Chapter 3 -
Strategic Experimentation in R&D Races
§ 3.1 Introduction
One of the main questions in “patent races” concerns the level of R&D ac-
tivity. Ever since Kamien and Schwartz [35] and Loury [39], many studies
have stressed the inefficiencies caused by competition in this type of races. A
central result they establish is that aggregate investment in R&D is usually
excessive, which relies on the well-known “tragedy-of-the-commons” effect.
Nonetheless, one can imagine situations in which an opposite inefficiency
prevails. For, if the competing firms can learn from each other’s activities,
information spill-overs could cause a “free-riding” effect. Our main contribu-
tion is to model a patent race in which both effects are possible equilibrium
phenomena.
As an example, consider the development of a new medicine. If the
pharmaceutical industry is highly concentrated, each company has almost
perfect information with regards to the R&D activities undertaken by the
other companies. Therefore, the release of good news by some company
could spark excessive competition and therefore decrease the expected prof-
itability of the patent for the medicine. Each company, rationally expecting
that, would refrain from undertaking the risky venture.
In this article, we attempt to model a simple multistage patent race in
order to stress this type of information externalities. By building on the
literature of “strategic experimentation”, started by Bolton and Harris [10]
, we analyse a dynamic race between two firms using two-armed bandit
technologies. Our model is meant to capture possible inefficiencies that
are caused by information externalities (spillovers) as well as by strategic
externalities as those discussed in the already existing literature.
The race is between two firms. The winner of the race is the firm that
completes two phases: Research & Development. The winner acquires a
patent and therefore fixed monopoly profits for a long period of time. For
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instance in the development of a new medicine, the research phase may refer
to the identification of the mechanisms that cause a certain disease, as well
as the substances that may control its symptoms or help the immune system
in the fight against it. On the other hand, the development phase may refer
to the trials of the medicine in animal or human subjects before the new
product is released to the market. Both firms start the race equipped with
similar bandit technologies which are all armed in the same state (either
good or bad). However, successes occur independently. In fact, one success
is enough for each stage to be completed.
In the research phase, the technologies can be either armed in a good
state, and generate a success with positive probability, or in a bad state,
and never generate a success. Therefore, with some positive probability,
the research phase can never be completed successfully, regardless of the
efforts of the two firms. In the medicine example discussed above, this idea
captures the uncertainty that pharmaceutical companies usually face when
they start investigating the possible causes of a disease. On the contrary,
and without loss of generality, we assume that in the development phase,
the technologies are always armed in a good state (and therefore known to
be able to generate successes) but successes occur only with some positive
probability.
The central results we establish are the following: In the research phase,
the two firms may under-invest relative to the socially efficient level of in-
vestment because of information spillovers. After the release of a success
from one firm in the research phase, information becomes a public good. At
that point, the lagging firm realises that advancement to the development
phase is feasible and therefore has an incentive to get back into the race in
order to catch up and pass the finish line first. This reduces the profitability
of the leading firm and each firm, rationally expecting that, decides not to
experiment at all in the research phase.
On the other hand, the over-investment (or duplication of efforts) effect
that has been widely stressed in the R&D literature can also be uncovered
in equilibrium. In our model, this is translated to duplication of efforts (in-
vestments) compared to social optimality. In fact, this effect can be realised
in any phase but it is more detrimental towards the end of the race, or in
other words, during the development phase. As we show, there are cases
in which both firms invest, even though social optimality requires only one
of them to invest. Thus, while the current R&D literature identifies the
inefficiency involved in over-investment as a result of externalities ignored
by the rival firms, and the experimentation literature identifies the funda-
mental inefficiency of information acquisition because of free-riding, in our
model both of these forces are at play.
 Related Literature. Loury [39], Lee and Wilde [38] and Dasgupta
and Stiglitz [16] analyse static strategic patent races in which investment in
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R&D is irreversible and takes place only once. Each firm’s investment de-
termines its speed of innovation. Loury [39] and Lee and Wilde [38] do not
explicitly model a market after the innovation occurs. They are mostly in-
terested in the individual and aggregate levels of R&D investment as well as
the degree of market concentration. On the contrary, Dasgupta and Stiglitz
[16] explicitly model the market after the innovation. They proceed to com-
parative static analysis in order to stress the effect market demand has in
the innovation process. One of the central results of all these articles is that
aggregate investment is socially excessive.
Reinganum [51, 52], Fudenberg et al. [22] and Harris and Vickers [28, 27]
extend the above static models to dynamic models in which firms have the
right to change their level of investment during the race. Even though they
make severe restrictions of how firms can alternate their investments, the
analysis seems turns out to be complicated. Reinganum [51, 52] analyse
a race in which each firm accumulates knowledge through time by invest-
ing in R&D. Innovation is stochastic and the time of successful completion
increases with the stock of relevant knowledge. Part of Reinganum’s con-
tribution is technical since this game is a representative differential game
with many technical difficulties. When knowledge is a private good, i.e. it
can only be used by the firm who accumulates it, then Reinganum shows
that in equilibrium there is over-investment and early innovation. On the
other hand, when knowledge accumulated by one firm can be used by other
firms, then there is a free-riding problem and therefore under-investment.
Fudenberg et al. [22] analyse a multistage patent race. They provide con-
ditions under which a race will be characterised by vigorous competition or
will degenerate into monopoly. The key idea is whether the lagging firm in
the race has time to “leapfrog” and catch up. In Harris and Vickers [27], it
is shown that the leader in the race exerts higher effort than the follower,
and effort increases as the gap between competitors decreases.
Grossman and Shapiro[26] is perhaps closer to our approach. They ex-
tend the model of Lee and Wilde [38] by adding one more phase in the de-
velopment of the project. Therefore, a firm, in order to win the race, must,
as in our model, complete two phases R&D. Firms have complete informa-
tion about each other’s actions. In their model, there is over-investment in
equilibrium relative to the socially efficient level of investment. The main
difference from our model is that we introduce uncertainty in the bandit
technology of the research phase and therefore informational externalities.
This allows us to stress the fundamental under-investment in the research
phase along with the over-investment in the development phase.
Lastly, there is by now a vast literature on strategic experimentation
started from Bolton and Harris [10] . Bolton and Harris [10] analyse two-
armed bandit models with several agents. Each player can learn from the
actions and outcomes of the other players and therefore, similarly to our
approach, information becomes a public good. They show that, in equilib-
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rium, a free-riding effect arises. Similarly to our approach, experimentation
in their article is below the socially efficient level. Keller, Rady and Krips
[36] analyse a similar model but with exponential bandits. The use of expo-
nential bandits in contrast to Bolton and Harris (1999) allows for analytical
tractability and therefore Keller, Rady and Krips [36] uncover also asym-
metric equilibria. Our model is way simpler than Bolton and Harris [10]
and Keller, Rady and Krips [36] first because investments are indivisible
and second because after a success by one player the game ends. There-
fore our game is more like a winner-takes-all race in contrast to papers on
strategic experimentation in which after a success by one player, the other
players continue investing in order to succeed as well. Lastly, the results
between our article and these of Bolton and Harris [10] and Keller, Rady
and Krips [36] are partly different because we ucncover both free-riding as
well as over-investment. Bergemann and Hege [5, 6] introduce the two-
armed bandit technologies into a dynamic moral hazard model.1 In their
model an entrepreneur seeks financing in order to run experiments needed
to complete a project. The technologies are similar to our available tech-
nologies in the research phase. They show that because of moral hazard,
and funds diversion, investment is relatively low compared to the socially
efficient counterpart and financing stops prematurely. In contrast to our
model, those models has only one firm experimenting, relying however to
external financing to run the experiments. In our model there are at least
two firms experimenting and they self-finance their experiments.
In Section 3.2 we present the model and notation. In Section 3.3 we
analyse the equilibria of the game In Section 3.4 we extend the model to
accommodate more than one stage in the development phase.
§ 3.2 The Model
Timing and Payoffs. Time is discrete and infinite: t ∈ N. There are
two firms, denoted by i = {1, 2}, that are engaged in an R&D race. Both
firms are risk-neutral, Bayesian expected utility maximisers. There is no dis-
counting. There are two phases to be completed, which can be considered
as Research and Development (R&D). Completion of every phase requires
investment (or effort), and the fixed investment cost to be paid every period
is c. The first firm that successfully completes both phases receives a mon-
etary payoff equal to V .2,3 As soon as some firm succeeds in the research
1See also Horner and Samuelson [31].
2The cost c can be thought either as a monetary cost or a disutility cost of effort. This
distinction is irrelevant in our model.
3The expected payoff V can be considered as the value of the product to be developed
when sold to some external agent. For instance, if the product is a drug, then we can in-
terpret the two firms as medical research firms and the external agent as a pharmaceutical
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phase, it can proceed to the last (and final) phase of development. Even if
one firm passes the research phase, the other firm has still time to invest
and potentially qualify to the development phase as well. If the development
phase is completed as well, then the first firm receives V and the second firm
0. In case both firms finish at the same time, then each firm receives V with
equal probability.4 Note that for a firm to qualify to the development phase,
it is a prerequisite to first pass the research phase.5 Each firm observes the
actions and outcomes of the rival firm, therefore the game is considered as
one of complete information.6
Notation and Technologies. In every phase there is a technology that
can be used to provide the breakthrough needed, and this is available to
both firms. The technology in the research phase is uncertain and risky.
When both firms are in the research phase, each one of them decides either
to use the technology or not, but, as we mentioned above, this is costly and
the fixed monetary amount to be paid is constant and denoted by c. On
the other hand, there is always the possibility of no experimentation at zero
cost. In this case, the probability of success is zero. There is uncertainty re-
garding the suitability of the technology to provide a success in the research
phase when in use. Specifically, the technology can be either in a good state
with probability α or in a bad state with probability 1−α. If in a good state,
the technology, after experimentation in the research phase, can generate a
success with probability θ or a failure with probability 1− θ. On the other
hand, if in a bad state, the technology can only generate a failure with prob-
ability 1. If no success takes place after one round of experimentation, then
the posterior is updated downwards. If a success occurs then the posterior
is updated to one since success is a fully informative signal.
On the contrary, the technology in the development phase is risky but
not uncertain. We assume that by investing c, each firm it can realise a
success with probability η and a failure with probability 1 − η. Therefore,
there is a fundamental difference between the available technologies in the
two phases. In the development phase the probability of success in each
stage is fixed every period. In the research phase the probability of success
is not fixed but can vary depending on the outcome of experimentation.
company.
4V can be considered as the monetary transfer from the seller of the product to the
firm that made the breakthrough. We assume that this is not observable or verifiable by
any outsider apart from the two firms. This simply means that no explicit contract can
be written between the two firms contingent on the breakthrough since its value is not
verifiable by a court of law.
5This assumption is easily justifiable if we consider the project as a product where both
phases must be completed in order to be sold to the market. If one phase has not been
completed then the product is considered as problematic and it has no market value.
6Given that the two firms are specialising on the same product, they have inside infor-
mation of each other’s actions.
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This captures the fundamental uncertainty firms face in the initial stages of
R&D activity.
WnX(Y,Z) denotes the individual value of the project for a firm in phase
X ∈ {R,D} if there are n firms active in some period, one firm is in phase
Y = {R,D} and the other one in phase Z = {R,D}.
§ 3.3 Equilibrium in Research and Development
It is easy to see that, due to no discounting, it can never be socially opti-
mal to operate both technologies in any of the periods, in any of the phases.
This is because the social cost of operating one technology, given that the
other one is active is c, and the social benefit is zero (the payoff is zero if
one succeeds given that the other succeeds). In fact, if both technologies,
are operated by a benevolent social planner possessing the same informa-
tion as the two firms, it is strictly dominant to operate one technology after
the other instead of both together.7 The assumption of no discounting is
without loss of generality. All our results hold even if the discount factor is
strictly less than one.
3.3.1 Both Firms in the Development Phase
Assume that both firms have qualified to the development phase. We will
first examine the socially efficient investment level and we will compare this
with the individual investment levels.
First assume that both technologies, being in the development phase, are
operated by a benevolent social planner possessing the same information as
the two firms. As we claimed earlier, it is never socially optimal to operate
both technologies in the same period. Therefore we will examine when it
is optimal to operate one technology at a time. Note that because of the
stationarity of the model, if it is ever optimal to operate one technology in
some period, then it will be optimal in any period thereafter. Therefore, it
is socially efficient to invest in one technology in the development phase if
and only if:
ηV ≥ c
We can define a cutoff point in the profitability of the project, such that it is
socially efficient to operate one technology, if and only if the “payoff-to-cost”
ratio is weakly above this cutoff point, or:
V
c
≥ 1
η
7We could equally assume that both firms merge and operate together.
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This is a general necessary condition for any of the technologies to be active.
In any other case, i.e. Vc <
1
η , it is never socially optimal to operate any of
the technologies in the development phase.
We can easily establish that the social value of the project in any period
t if at least one technology is in the development phase is given by:8
V − c
η
Turning our interest to the individual behaviour of the two firms being
both in the same phase, note that they will both be active if and only if:
[η(1− η) + 0.5η2)]V − c ≥ 0
Perhaps, as we did above, we could define a cutoff point in the prof-
itability of the product, such that both firms will be certainly active in the
development phase, as:
V
c
≥ 1
η(1− 0.5η)
In case the profitability of the product is such that:
1
η(1− 0.5η) >
V
c
≥ 1
η
then only one firm will be active in equilibrium. Even though there are
equilibria in which the identity of the firm investing is determined randomly,
we will concentrate, without loss of generality, in equilibria in which the
identity of the firm who invests remains the same.9
The value of any firm, if both firms are active in the development phase
is denoted by W 2D(D,D) and is given by:
W 2D(D,D) = η(1− 0.5η)V − c+ (1− (1− η)2)(η(1− 0.5η)V − c) + ...
=
η(1− 0.5η)V − c
1− (1− η)2
On the other hand, the value of the only active firm in the development
phase is denoted as W 1D(D,D) and is given by:
W 1D(D,D) = V −
c
η
Given that it is never socially optimal both technologies to be active, but
as we saw there are cases where both firms acting independently are indeed
8The expected value is ηV −c+(1−η)(ηV −c)+(1−η)2(ηV −c)+.... = ηV−c
1−(1−η) = V − cη
9 There are two symmetric SPNE: If each firm believes that the other one will invest,
then it is best response for it not to invest. The subgame is similar to the “Battle-of-
Sexes” game. All along we will not consider mixed-strategy equilibria. We only examine
equilibria in which both firms play degenerate strategies.
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active, we can easily deduce that there may be an inefficient allocation of
resources in equilibrium. Note that both firms would be better off using only
one technology, bear one cost and share the payoff with equal probability.10
Proposition 3.3.1. If both firms have advanced to the development phase
and Vc ≥ 1η(1−0.5η) , then there is over-investment in equilibrium.
The above result is relatively intuitive. Over-investment occurs in the
last phase because in probability η2 both firms make a breakthrough and
one of the costs c is, in this event, a social waste which the firms do not
internalise. The externalities caused by both firms to each other lead to
socially inefficient levels of investment.
3.3.2 One Team in the Research and the Other in the De-
velopment Phase
In this section, we assume that one firm has already qualified to the de-
velopment phase and the other one is still lagging in the race. Given the
success of the the leading firm however, the firm that is now lagging knows
that advancing to the development phase is possible or α = 1.
First, given that one technology has qualified to the development phase,
it is never socially optimal to invest in the technology that is still in the
research phase. However, from an individual point of view, there are SPNE
depending on the parameter values, in which in some cases, the firm that is
still in the research phase invests.
Even though there may be equilibria in which the leading firm stops
investing when the lagging also advances to the development phase, we find
as more reasonable equilibria those at which the leading firm never does.
Given this, it is easy to verify that if 1η(1−0.5η) >
V
c ≥ 1η , then it is not
optimal for the lagging firm to invest. This is because in this case, only
one firm will be active in the development phase. Therefore, a necessary
condition for the lagging firm to be active is Vc >
1
η(1−0.5η) . The expected
10Of course, it is assumed that no explicit contracts can be written that allow co-
operation, exactly as in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium or any game in which the Nash
equilibrium is inefficient. We can further justify this assumption on the following grounds:
Assume that the payoff of successfully developing the product and selling it in the market
is X, distributed in the interval [0, A] with a cdf function F (X). Moreover, E(X) = V
where E is the mean expectational operator of the distribution. Therefore, both firms
believe that the ex-ante expected payoff of selling the product in the market is V , but the
true payoff can be anything from 0 to A. The true payoff can be only realised when the
product is developed. Assuming that no outsider can observe or verify the true payoff, the
firm that develops the product and promises to deliver half the payoff to the other firm will
never do so by claiming that the realised payoff is zero. Given that this is not verifiable,
no firm will agree to pay half the cost to the other firm and then expect to receive half
the payoff after realisation of uncertainty in the fear of being “held-up”. This ex-post
opportunistic behaviour makes cooperation impossible and therefore leads to inefficient
Nash equilibria.
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value of the firm that is in the research phase, while the other firm is in the
development phase and they are both active is denoted by W 2R(R,D). This
value can be calculated as:
W 2R(R,D) = (1− θ)(1− η)W 2R(R,D) + θ(1− η)W 2D(D,D)− c
or
W 2R(R,D) =
−c+ θ(1− η)η(1−0.5η)V−c
1−(1−η)2
1− (1− θ)(1− η)
We can see that as long as this value is positive, or θ(1−η)η(1−0.5η)V−c
1−(1−η)2 ≥
c, then in the unique SPNE the lagging firm always invests because it is
always profitable to do so.
As previously, we can find a cutoff in the profitability of the project such
that there is an inefficiency because the firm that has lagged in the race does
not internalise the externality that imposes to the other firm. This cutoff is
given by:
V
c
≥ 1− (1− η)
2 + θ(1− η)
θ(1− η) ·
1
η(1− 0.5η)
We conclude this section with the following proposition that highlights
the inefficiencies caused in the Development phase.
Proposition 3.3.2. If one firm has advanced to the development phase, the
other is still in the research phase and Vc ≥ 1−(1−η)
2+θ(1−η)
θ(1−η) · 1η(1−0.5η) there
is over-investment in equilibrium.
For later results, it is useful to also characterise the value of the firm that
is leading the race- i.e. the firm that is in the development phase given that
the other firm is in the research phase- when both firms are active. This is
denoted by W 2D(R,D) and is given by:
W 2D(R,D) = ηV + (1− θ)(1− η)W 2D(R,D) + θ(1− η)W 2D(D,D)− c
or
W 2D(R,D) =
−c+ ηV + (1− η) θ
(
1
2V − c− c2η−η2
)
1− (1− θ) (1− η)
Vacuously, the value of the leading firm, when the lagging firm is not
active any more is denoted by W 1D(R,D) and equals the social value or
W 1D(R,D) = V − cη .
3.3.3 Research Phase
We are now ready to analyse the socially optimal behaviour as well as the
equilibrium behaviour when both firms (or technologies) are in the research
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phase. We know that if one of the two firms advances to the develop-
ment phase, then the equilibrium is given in Subsection B. On the other
hand, in case both firms advance to the development phase, then the equi-
librium is given in Subsection A. In the two previous cases, we saw that
over-investment is possible, since there are parameter values according to
which only one technology should be active, but both are, in equilibrium.
In this section we would like to establish that if both firms are in the research
phase, another fundamental inefficiency commonly observed in R&D races
is possible. This is the well known under-investment, due to free-riding.
Free-riding is possible in this model since success in the research phase by
one firm releases good news to the rival firm. Information therefore becomes
a public good and a free-riding effect arises in equilibrium. On the other
hand, it is possible to have over-investment in this phase as well, for some
parameter values. Thus, in the research phase, both over-investment as well
under-investment are possible equilibrium phenomena.
Given the uncertainty about the quality of the technology in the research
phase, one needs to specify the evolution of the belief after experimentation.
There are three possible cases to consider: If no firm experimented, then
it is apparent that no updating takes place and the posterior probability
remains the same (as the prior). If, however, one firm experimented and
succeeded in some period then α = 1, since success is a fully informative
signal. On the other hand, if some firm experimented and failed then this
brings bad news regarding the suitability of the technology to complete the
state and the posterior probability is downgraded, by Bayes’ rule, to:
α′ =
α(1− θ)
(1− α) + α(1− θ) < α
Note that the behaviour of the two firms in the research phase crucially
depends on the continuation value of the project, as this has been deter-
mined in the previous two sections. It is common sense to note that the
more lucrative the project is (α is higher ceteris paribus), the higher the
experimentation will be in the research phase. Note that even in this phase,
it is never socially optimal to experiment in both technologies for the same
reason it was never optimal in the development phase. It seems rather com-
plicated to analyse the equilibrium given that there are too many cases to
be considered in the continuation of the game as these have been examined
in the two previous sections. To stress the result of the paper as clear as
possible we will analyse only the two most interesting cases.
The first case is when Vc <
1−(1−η)(θ−(1−η))
θ(1−η) · 1η(1−0.5η) . From Subsection
B, we know that as long as one firm advances to the development phase, the
firm that remained behind will not experiment anymore. For some param-
eter values, both firms would be active in the development phase, if both
advanced to it. Thus, it is rather straightforward to see that the two firms
compete in the research phase exactly as they do in the development phase
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in this range of parameters. In other words, the first firm that advances to
the development phase is considered the “winner” of the phase. We should,
therefore, expect that over-investment is possible in this phase for the exact
same reason that it was possible in the development phase. The two firms
do no internalise the externalities impose through their actions. Indeed,
as we prove in the following lemma, over-investment is the only source of
externality in this range of parameters.
Lemma 3.3.3. If both firms are in the research phase, Vc <
1
η(1−0.5η) and
αθ(1− 0.5θ)W 1D(D,D) ≥ 0 then there is over-investment in equilibrium.
Proof. First, note that when Vc <
1
η(1−0.5η) , from the analysis above, the
lagging firm will not invest. Therefore, in this range of parameters the race
in the research phase is similar to the race in the development phase. The
winner is the first one that succeeds in the research phase. If both succeed
simultaneously then we assume that each firm has equal probability to keep
on investing in the development phase. The other firm becomes inactive.
Substituting for W 1D(D,D) = V − cη , the question boils down to whether
c
θ(1− 0.5θ)(V − cη )
≤ 1
Rearranging, we can find that over-investment occurs if and only if
V
c
≥
θ(1− 0.5θ) + 1η
θ(1− 0.5θ)
To complete the proof, we have to check that for some parameter values
θ(1− η) + 1− (1− η)2
θ(1− η) ·
1
η(1− 0.5η) >
θ(1− 0.5θ) + 1η
θ(1− 0.5θ) >
1
η(1− 0.5η)
For the first inequality, by rearranging we get that
(1− (1− η)2 + θ(1− η))(1− 0.5θ) > (1− η)(1− 0.5η)
which for each value of η is a quadratic equation with respect to θ. One can
easily see that there are parameter values that this inequality is satisfied
and moreover
θ(1−0.5θ)+ 1
η
θ(1−0.5θ) >
1
η(1−0.5η) (for instance η = 0.5, θ = 0.9).
The intuition behind the above result is that when Vc <
1−(1−η)(θ−(1−η))
θ(1−η) ·
1
η(1−0.5η) , there is no room for under-investment because there is no infor-
mational externalities and therefore no free-riding effect. This is because as
long as one firm remains behind in the race, the game is over because it is
not profitable anymore to experiment in order to catch up.
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The most interesting case, however, and one of the distinguishing fea-
tures of this paper, is when Vc ≥ 1−(1−η)(θ−(1−η))θ(1−η) · 1η(1−0.5η) . Note that in
this range of parameter values, it is never socially optimal to operate the
technology that has lagged in the race, but it is individually optimal. How-
ever, we will show that it is possible, when both firms are in the beginning
of the race to be socially optimal to operate one of the two technologies, but
none to be active in equilibrium. This is indeed true as it is proved in the
proposition below.
Proposition 3.3.4. If both firms are in the research phase
1. Vc ≥ 1−(1−η)(θ−(1−η))θ(1−η) · 1η(1−0.5η)
2. α θ (ηV − c+ (1− η)(V − cη ))− c ≥ 0
3. α θ [(ηV − c) + (1− η)W 2D(R,D)]− c < 0
then there is under-investment in equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that (1) holds. We will show that there are parameter val-
ues such that (2) and (3) hold. If both equations hold for some range of
parameters, then it is necessarily the case that under-investment happens
in equilibrium. The question boils down to whether there are parameter
values such that V − cη > W 2D(R,D). By manipulating W 2D(R,D), we can
find that
W 2D(R,D) =
−c+ ηV + (1− η) θ
(
1
2V − c− c2η−η2
)
1− (1− θ) (1− η)
=
V
(
η + θ(1−η)2
)
− c
(
1 + (1− η) θ + (1−η)θ
2η−η2
)
η + θ − θη
=
η + θ−ηθ2
η + θ − θη
V − c1 + (1− η) θ + (1−η)θ2η−η2
η + θ(1−η)2

Let
γ =
η + θ−ηθ2
η + θ − θη , β =
1 + (1− η) θ + (1−η)θ
2η−η2
η + θ−ηθ2
Thus, our goal is to show that
V − c
η
> γ[V − βc]
Given that
η+ θ−ηθ
2
η+θ−θη < 1, for any η ∈ (0, 1), it is sufficient to show that
1 + (1− η) θ + (1−η)θ
2η−η2
η + θ−ηθ2
>
1
η
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which holds for all θ ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ (0, 1).
The intuition behind the above result is the following: Assume that the
prior probability α is small enough such that it is socially optimal for only
one technology to be active in the research phase and none to be active after
a failure. It may be that because the firm that decides to invest in some
period in the research phase knows that the other firm will get into the race
after a success refrains from doing so. Therefore, for α small enough, it may
be socially optimal for one firm to be active in some period, but none is in
equilibrium. This is a well-known free-riding effect commonly observed in
practice, especially in patent races. When some research firm is planning to
invest in the development of some product (drug, high-technology product,
etc.) and cannot control the information to be released to the competitors,
it may decide not to do so. Research firms refrain from developing new risky
products, in the fear of vast competition after the announcement of good
news that would decrease profitability of the product considerably.
§ 3.4 Conclusion
In this paper we studied a winner-takes-all R&D race as a two-armed bandit
model. Two firms competed on the development of a new product but they
first had to pass two phases (Research & Development) before they could sell
the product to the market. Firms possessed identical bandit technologies
in every phase and could observe each other’s actions and outcomes. The
technology in the research phase was uncertain, in the sense that it was
armed either in a good state, in which case after experimentation it could
produce the required breakthrough with some probability, or in a bad state,
in which case no breakthrough could ever occur. On the other hand, in
the development phase the technology was always in a good state and it
could produce the required breakthrough with some positive probability.
Experimentation was costly and the monetary cost to be paid for every
experiment was fixed. The winner of the race was the one completing both
phases successfully.
We analysed the SPNE of this dynamic game and compared the levels
of investment of the two firms with the socially optimal counterparts. We
showed that, in equilibrium, two possible inefficiencies are likely to occur.
On the one hand, in the initial phase (research), there were parameter values
such that under-investment could occur in equilibrium. Even though it was
socially optimal for at least one firm to be active, none was in equilibrium.
On the other hand, another fundamental inefficiency, this of over-investment,
that has been extensively examined in the R&D literature was uncovered
in equilibrium. This is a phenomenon according to which both teams ex-
periment, even though one of the costs of experimentation is a social waste.
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Over-investment could occur in any of the phases, but it was more frequent
towards the end of the race.
The model we analysed was very elementary with many simplifying as-
sumptions. In a previous draft of this paper, we had analysed a more com-
plicated model with discounting and both phases to be uncertain.11 Even
though this model was more general the analytical tractability was pro-
hibitive. However, all our results go through even in this more general model
and, hence, we traded-off generality for simplicity and tractability. In case
of discounting, the planner would trade-off the time cost and wasting one
cost every period (in case he experimented in both technologies). On the
other hand, the individual teams would not take into account this trade-off
and would only experiment as long as the expected payoff exceeded the cost
(if the rival firm was active). Henceforth, it is clear that even there we could
find parameter values such that over-investment could occur in equilibrium,
at least in the development phase. On the other hand, in the research phase,
under-investment would be possible in this model for the exact same rea-
son under-investment can happen in the more basic model. Again we could
find parameter values, such that the planner would not invest in the lagging
technology after a success in the research phase but, acting individually,
the lagging team would do. Therefore, for α low enough, no team would
be active (even if it would be socially optimal one to be), because of the
free-riding effect.
11By this we mean that in the development phase, the technology was either in a good
or in a bad state.
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- Appendix A -
Chapter 1
§ A.1 Proof of existence of an interior maxi-
mum under complete information
First, note that in any equilibrium under complete information, banks must
earn zero profits for every loan contract. This is because entrepreneurs
possess all the bargaining power, being able to apply to any contract they
like when their type is known.1 Therefore, piiRs,iXi + (1 − pii)Rf,iXi =
Xi. The equilibrium investment level can be found by solving the following
unconstrained optimisation program for each i:
max
Xi
hi(Xi) = piiγif(Xi)−Xi
Lemma A.1.1. For each i = H,L, hi(Xi) has am unterior global maximum
XFBi .
Proof: Let hi(Xi) = piiγif(Xi) − Xi. Since f is twice continuously
differentiable, hi is also twice continuously differentiable with h
′
i(Xi) =
piiγif
′(Xi) − 1 and h′′i (Xi) = piiγif ′′(Xi). Since f
′′
< 0, h′′ < 0 and there-
fore hi is concave. From the Inada conditions limXi→∞ h′i(Xi) = −1 < 0
and limXi→0 h′i(Xi) = ∞. Since h′i is strictly decreasing, continuous and
the limits are defined as above, from the intermediate value theorem, there
exists exactly one XFBi such that h
′
i(X
FB
i ) = 0 ⇒ f ′(XFBi ) = 1γipii . Given
that hi(0) = 0 and hi is concave X
FB
i is a global maximum and moreover
hi(X
FB
i ) > 0. Q.E.D.
1When information is perfect, the set of equilibria of this game is identical to the set
of equilibria of a game in which banks compete a la Bertrand in loan contracts.
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§ A.2 Proof that both types strictly prefer the
first-best contract of type H over this
of type L
Consider the payoffs of type L from the two contracts:
V L(XFBL , R
FB
s,L , R
FB
f,L ) = piL
(
γLf(X
FB
L )−
XFBL
piL
)
V L(XFBH , R
FB
s,H , R
FB
f,H) = piL
(
γLf(X
FB
H )−
XFBH
piH
)− piH − piL
piH
RFBf,HX
FB
H ,
Recollect that RFBf,H ≤ 0 (entrepreneurs do not possess any wealth in the
failure state), the payoff of type L increases as Rf,H decreases. Therefore,
it suffices to show that type L’s payoff is higher even for Rf,H = 0.
Define the following two functions:
ζ(X) = piLγLf(X)−X
and
ξ(X) = piLγLf(X)− piL
piH
X
Examining these two functions we can see that they are both concave
and, given Assumption 1.2.1, they achieve a unique interior maximum.
Moreover, the maximiser of ξ(X) (call it X ′) is greater than that of ζ(·)
(which is XFBL ), and X
FB
L < X
FB
H < X
′. ξ′(X) > ζ ′(X) for any X. Since
ξ(0) = ζ(0) = 0, ξ(X) > ζ(X) for any X. Therefore, ξ(X ′) > ξ(XFBH ) >
ζ(XFBL ). Q.E.D.
§ A.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3.1.
Since type L is the one who is eager to misrepresent his type, and because
banks must earn zero profits for each equilibrium contract (because of the
intuitive criterion), type L receives the same contract as under perfect in-
formation. We can find the equilibrium contract of type H by solving the
following maximisation program:
max
XH ,Rs,H ,Rf,H
piH(γHf(XH)−Rs,HXH)− (1− piH)Rf,HXH
s.t.
piHRs,HXH + (1− piH)Rf,HXH = XH
piLγLf(X
FB
L )−XFBL = piL(γLf(XH)−Rs,HXH)− (1− piL)Rf,HXH
XH ≥ 0
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Substituting into the incentive constraint the zero profit condition:
γLf(XH)− XH
piH
− piH − piL
piHpiL
Rf,HXH = γLf(X
FB
L )−
XFBL
piL
Note that as long as RHf is negative, given that entrepreneurs have no
wealth in the failure state, the incentive constraint is tighter. Therefore,
the least costly contract that makes zero profits requires RHf = 0. At any
separating equilibrium the following condition must be satisfied:
γLf(zH)− z
H
piH
= γLf(zˆL)− zˆ
L
piL
(A.1)
Note that the lower isRf,H , the tighter is the incentive constraint. There-
fore, the least costly contract that makes zero profits requires Rf,H = 0. At
any separating equilibrium the following condition must be satisfied:
γLf(XH)− XH
piH
= γLf(X
FB
L )−
XFBL
piL
(A.2)
Lemma A.3.1. Equation (A.2) has two solutions (XNTH , X
∗
H) with X
NT
H <
X∗H , and given the maintained assumptions the one that maximises the pay-
off of type H is XNTH .
Proof: Let g(XH) = γLf(XH) − XHpiH − [γLf(XFBL ) −
XFBL
piL
]. We know
that
g(0) = −[γLf(XFBL )−
XFBL
piL
] < 0
and
g(XFBL ) = X
FB
L (
1
piH
− 1
piL
) > 0
Therefore, since g is continuous and strictly monotonic in the interval (0, XFBL ),
from the intermediate value theorem, there exists exactly one root of g in
the interval (0, XFBL ). Let us call this root X
NT
H .
Consider now
lim
XH→∞
g(XH) = lim
XH→∞
(γLf(XH)− XH
piH
)− [γLf(XFBL )−
XFBL
piL
]
where.
lim
XH→∞
(γLf(XH)−XH
piH
) = lim
XH→∞
XH
piH
(
γLf(XH)
XH
piH
−1) = lim
XH→∞
XH
piH
× lim
XH→∞
(
γlf(XH)
XH
piH
−1)
limXH→∞
γLf(XH)
XH
piH
is not defined, therefore, we can apply l’Hopital’s rule:
lim
XH→∞
γLf(XH)
XH
piH
= lim
XH→∞
γLf
′(XH)
1
piH
= 0
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because of Inada’s conditions.
Hence, limXH→∞
XH
piH
× limXH→∞(γLf(XH)XH
piH
− 1) = −∞, and again from
the intermediate value theorem, there is a another root of g in the interval
(XFBL ,∞). Call this root X∗H .
To show that the payoff of type H is higher under the first root consider
the following:
γLf(X
NT
H )−
XNTH
piH
−[γLf(XFBL )−
XFBL
piL
] = γLf(X
∗
H)−
X∗H
piH
−[γLf(XFBL )−
XFBL
piL
] = 0
Therefore:
f(XNTH )− f(X∗H) =
XNTH −X∗H
piH
· 1
γL
γH [f(X
NT
H )− f(X∗H)] =
XNTH −X∗H
piH
· γH
γL
γH [f(X
NT
H )− f(X∗H)]−
XNTH −X∗H
piH
=
XNTH −X∗H
piH
· (γH
γL
− 1)
But since
XNTH −X∗H
piH
· (γHγL − 1) > 0, γH [f(XNTH )− f(X∗H)]−
XNTH −X∗H
piH
> 0
which proves the lemma. Q.E.D.
§ A.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4.1
Let the tax system be (−ts, tf ). We will show that type H is always better
off using the subsidy in the failure state in order to borrow more.
In any separating equilibrium without taxes type L produces efficiently.
His payoff after taxation is:
V L(XFBL , R
L
s , R
L
f ) = piL(γLf(X
FB
L )−
XFBL
piL
− ts) + (1− piL)tf
= piL(γLf(X
FB
L )−
XFBL
piL
) +
pi − piL
1− pi ts
which is increasing in ts given that p¯i > piL. Intuitively this happens because
type L is cross-subsidised by type H. On the other hand, the equilibrium
contract of type H by solving the following optimisation program:
max
XH ,Rs,H ,Rf,H
piH(γHf(XH)− ts −Rs,HXH) + (1− piH)(tf −Rf,HXH)
s.t.
piHRs,HXH + (1− piH)Rf,HXH = XH
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piL(γLf(X
FB
L )− ts) + (1− piL)(tf−)−XFBL =
piL(γLf(XH)−Rs,HXH − ts) + (1− piL)(tf −Rf,HXH)
Rf,HXH ≤ tf
XH ≥ 0
Combining the zero profit condition with the incentive constraint, we
obtain the following:
γLf(XH)−XH
piH
= (γLf(X
FB
L )−
XFBL
piL
)+(
1− piL
piL
− 1− piH
piH
)Rf,HXH (A.3)
Given that
(
1−piL
piL
− 1−piHpiH
)
Rf,H > 0 for Rf,H > 0, the smallest root of (A.3)
XTH is greater than X
NT
H . The payoff of type H from this contract is:
piHγHf(X
T
H)−XTH +
pi − piH
1− pi ts = hH(XH) +
pi − piH
1− pi ts
From Lemma A.1.1, we know that hH(XH) is a strictly increasing func-
tion in [0, XFBH ]. Therefore, the payoff of type H increases when he uses all
the subsidy (given that this small enough as defined below) in the equilib-
rium contract, or: Rf,HXH = tf . Q.E.D.
§ A.5 Proof of Proposition 1.4.2
Let γLf(XH) − XHpiH − (γLf(XFBL ) −
XFBL
piL
) − ( (1−piL)piL −
(1−piH)
piH
) pi1−pi ts = 0,
and denote as XH(ts) the smallest root of this equation. XH(ts) defines a
function XH(·) : [0, t∗s]→ [0,∞), where t∗s is such that: f ′(XH(t∗s)) = 1γHpiH .
Lemma A.5.1. XH(ts) is strictly increasing, twice continuously differen-
tiable and convex in [0, t∗s].
Proof: Denote as q =
(
(1−piL)
piL
− (1−piH)piH
)
pi
1−pi > 0 and define the fol-
lowing function:
ψ(XH) =
1
q
(
γLf(XH)− XH
piH
− (piLf(XFBL )− XFBLpiH )
)
Note that ψ(XH) =
g(XH)
q with q > 0. We want ψ(XH) = ts. Since
ψ(·) is continous, strictly increasing and twice differentiable we know that
it is one-to-one and therefore invertible in the interval [0, XFBH ). Denote
the inverse function as ψ−1(·). Therefore, XH = ψ−1(ts). The first and
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second derivatives of ψ are well defined. Because ψ is strictly increasing, its
inverse function will also be strictly increasing. Moreover, since ψ is differen-
tiable, ψ−1 will also be differentiable with (ψ−1)′(ts) = 1ψ′(XH) > 0 (because
ψ′(XH) > 0), and (ψ−1)′′(ts) = − ψ
′′(XH)
(ψ′(XH))2
> 0 (because ψ′′(XH) < 0).
Therefore ψ−1(ts) is convex. Q.E.D.
Let the function G(ts) be as in (1.6). Since f(XH) is continuous and
the first and second derivatives exist and they are continuous for any XH >
0, and XH(ts) is also continuous and differentiable in [0, t
∗
s], G(ts) is also
continuous and differentiable in [0, t∗s]. Denote as G′(ts) the first derivative
of G(ts) with respect to ts. Then:
G′(ts) = (γHf ′(XH(ts))− 1
piH
) · (XH)′(ts) + (1− piH
piH
pi
1− pi − 1)
=
γHf
′(XH(ts))− 1piH
γLf ′(XH(ts))− 1piH
· q + (1− piH
piH
pi
1− pi − 1) (A.4)
We will show G(ts) is strictly concave, and there exists pi
min such that
G′(t˜s) = 0, for some t˜s > 0, ∀ pi ∈ [pimin, piH ].
First, it is rather easy to show that G′(ts) is strictly decreasing for any
ts ∈ [0, t∗s]. Evaluating G′(ts) at ts = t∗s and ts = 0 we have that:
G′(t∗s) = (
1− piH
piH
pi
1− pi − 1) < 0
for any pi ∈ [piL, piH) and
G′(0) = (γHf ′(XH(0))− 1
piH
)(XH)
′(0) + (
1− piH
piH
pi
1− pi − 1)
Since γHf
′(XH(0)) − 1piH and (XH)′(0) are both positive, and (
1−piH
piH
pi
1−pi −
1) < 0 for any pi, there exists some pimin such that G′(0) ≥ 0 for any
pi ∈ [pimin, piH). By the intermediate value theorem, because G′(ts) is strictly
decreasing, when pi ∈ [pimin, piH ], there exists exactly one root (t˜s > 0), such
that G′(t˜s) = 0. Given that G′(·) is strictly positive for any ts ∈ [0, t˜s)
and strictly negative for any ts ∈ [t˜s, t∗s], G(ts) is strictly concave and t˜s
corresponds to a global maximum in [0, t∗s). Therefore, when pi ∈ [pimin, piH ]
there exists some t˜s > 0 that maximises the payoff of type H. Q.E.D.
List of Figures
2.1 A graphical illustration of Wilson’s model for T = 2 . . . . . 23
2.2 The RSW allocation for the special case of T = 2 and Ω = 1 . 25
2.3 An Efficient Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
63
64 List of Figures
Bibliography
[1] Robinson J. Acemoglu, D. Economic origins of dictatorship and democ-
racy. Cambridge University Press, 2005. 14
[2] G. Akerlof. The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the
market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 488–
500, 1970. 37
[3] G.B. Asheim and T. Nilssen. Non-discriminating renegotiation in a
competitive insurance market. European Economic Review, 40(9):1717–
1736, 1996. 20
[4] J.S. Banks and J. Sobel. Equilibrium selection in signaling games.
Econometrica, pages 647–661, 1987. 21
[5] D. Bergemann and U. Hege. Venture capital financing, moral hazard,
and learning. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(6):703–735, 1998. 44
[6] D. Bergemann and U. Hege. The financing of innovation: learning and
stopping. RAND Journal of Economics, pages 719–752, 2005. 44
[7] H. Bester. Screening vs. rationing in credit markets with imperfect
information. American Economic Review, 75(4):850–855, 1985. 6
[8] H. Bester. The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect infor-
mation. European Economic Review, 31(4):887–899, 1987. 6
[9] A. Bisin and P. Gottardi. Efficient competitive equilibria with adverse
selection. Journal of Political Economy, 114(3):485–516, 2006. 7, 21
[10] P. Bolton and C. Harris. Strategic experimentation. Econometrica,
67(2):349–374, 1999. 41, 43, 44
[11] I.K. Cho and D.M. Kreps. Signaling games and stable equilibria. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 102(2):179–221, 1987. 9, 21
[12] A. Citanna and P. Siconolfi. Incentive efficient price systems in large
insurance economies with adverse selection. Working paper, 2012. 21
65
66 Bibliography
[13] B.G. Dahlby. Adverse selection and pareto improvements through com-
pulsory insurance. Public Choice, 37(3):547–558, 1981. 7
[14] P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin. The existence of equilibrium in discontinu-
ous economic games i: Theory. Review of Economic Studies, 53(1):1–26,
1986. 19
[15] P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin. The existence of equilibrium in discon-
tinuous economic games ii: Applications. Review of Economic Studies,
53(1):27–41, 1986. 19
[16] P. Dasgupta and J. Stiglitz. Uncertainty, industrial structure, and the
speed of r&d. Bell Journal of Economics, pages 1–28, 1980. 42, 43
[17] D. De Meza and D. Webb. Too much investment: a problem of asym-
metric information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2):281–292,
1987. 6
[18] T. Diasakos and K. Koufopoulos. Efficient nash equilibrium under ad-
verse selection. Available at SSRN 1944825, 2011. 20
[19] P. Dubey and J. Geanakoplos. Competitive pooling: Rothschild-stiglitz
reconsidered. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4):1529–1570, 2002.
21
[20] M. Engers and L. Fernandez. Market equilibrium with hidden knowl-
edge and self-selection. Econometrica, pages 425–439, 1987. 19
[21] P.S. Faynzilberg. Credible forward commitments and risk-sharing equi-
libria. Technical report, mimeo, 2006. 20
[22] R. Fudenberg, D. Gilbert, J. Stiglitz, and J. Tirole. Preemption,
leapfrogging and competition in patent races. European Economic Re-
view, 22(1):3–31, 1983. 43
[23] D. Gale. A walrasian theory of markets with adverse selection. Review
of Economic Studies, 59(2):229–255, 1992. 21
[24] D. Gale. Equilibria and pareto optima of markets with adverse selection.
Economic Theory, 7(2):207–235, 1996. 21
[25] D. Gale. Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection. Eco-
nomic Theory, 18(2):391–414, 2001. 21
[26] G. Grossman and C. Shapiro. Dynamic r & d competition. The Eco-
nomic Journal, 97(386):372–387, 1987. 43
[27] C. Harris and J. Vickers. Racing with uncertainty. Review of Economic
Studies, 54(1):1–21, 1987. 43
Bibliography 67
[28] Christopher Harris and John Vickers. Perfect equilibrium in a model
of a race. The Review of Economic Studies, 52(2):193–209, 1985. 43
[29] M. Hellwig. Some recent developments in the theory of competition
in markets with adverse selection. European Economic Review, 31(1-
2):319–325, 1987. 19, 20
[30] B. Holmstro¨m and R. Myerson. Efficient and durable decision rules
with incomplete information. Econometrica, pages 1799–1819, 1983.
17, 24
[31] J. Horner and L. Samuelson. Incentives for experimenting agents. 2012.
44
[32] R. Innes. Investment and government intervention in credit markets
when there is asymmetric information. Journal of Public Economics,
46(3):347–381, 1991. 7
[33] D. Jaffee and T. Russell. Imperfect information, uncertainty, and credit
rationing. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4):651–666, 1976. 6
[34] GA Jehle and PJ Reny. Advanced microeconomic theory. Harlow [etc.]:
Financial Times Prentice Hall, 2011. 23
[35] Schwartz N. Kamien, M. Timing of innovations under rivalry. Econo-
metrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 43–60, 1972. 41
[36] Rady S. Keller, G. and M. Cripps. Strategic experimentation with
exponential bandits. Econometrica, 73(1):39–68, 2005. 44
[37] E. Kohlberg and J.F. Mertens. On the strategic stability of equilibria.
Econometrica, pages 1003–1037, 1986. 21
[38] T. Lee and L. Wilde. Market structure and innovation: a reformulation.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94(2):429–436, 1980. 42, 43
[39] G. Loury. Market structure and innovation. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, pages 395–410, 1979. 41, 42, 43
[40] D. Martimort. Multi-principaux avec anti-selection. Annales
d’Economie et de Statistique, pages 1–37, 1992. 28
[41] A. Martin. A model of collateral, investment, and adverse selection.
Journal of Economic Theory, 144(4):1572–1588, 2009. 6, 7, 36
[42] A. Martin. Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the
missing market. 2011. 7
68 Bibliography
[43] E. Maskin and J. Tirole. The principal-agent relationship with an in-
formed principal, ii: Common values. Econometrica, pages 1–42, 1992.
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 30, 32, 33
[44] W. Mimra and A. Wambach. A game-theoretic foundation for the
wilson equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse se-
lection. CESifo Working Paper Series, 2011. 20
[45] H. Miyazaki. The rat race and internal labor markets. The Bell Journal
of Economics, pages 394–418, 1977. 19
[46] R. Myerson. Mechanism design by an informed principal. Econometrica,
pages 1767–1797, 1983. 17, 18, 20, 26, 30, 33, 35
[47] N. Netzer and F. Scheuer. A game theoretic foundation of competitive
equilibria with adverse selection. Working paper, 2011. 19
[48] P. Picard. Participating insurance contracts and the rothschild-stiglitz
equilibrium puzzle. Working paper– Ecole Polytecnhic, Centre National
de la Recherce Scientifique, 2009. 20
[49] E. Prescott and R. Townsend. General competitive analysis in an econ-
omy with private information. International Economic Review, 25(1):1–
20, 1984. 21
[50] E. Prescott and R. Townsend. Pareto optima and competitive equilibria
with adverse selection and moral hazard. Econometrica, pages 21–45,
1984. 21
[51] J. Reinganum. Dynamic games of innovation. Journal of Economic
Theory, 25(1):21–41, 1981. 43
[52] J. Reinganum. A dynamic game of r and d: Patent protection and
competitive behavior. Econometrica, pages 671–688, 1982. 43
[53] J. Riley. Informational equilibrium. Econometrica, pages 331–359, 1979.
19
[54] R. Rosenthal and A. Weiss. Mixed-strategy equilibrium in a market
with asymmetric information. Review of Economic Studies, 51(2):333–
342, 1984. 19
[55] M. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz. Equilibrium in competitive insurance
markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 90(4):629–649, 1976. 7, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 33
[56] M. Spence. Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
87(3):355–374, 1973. 9, 17, 20, 21, 30
Bibliography 69
[57] J. Stiglitz and A. Weiss. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect
information. American economic review, pages 393–410, 1981. 6
[58] L. Stole. Mechanism design under common agency. Program in Law
and Economics, Harvard Law School, 1991. 28
[59] C. Wilson. A model of insurance markets with incomplete information.
Journal of Economic Theory, 16(2):167–207, 1977. 7, 17, 19, 22
